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CONSENT, INFORMED: RETHINKING 
INFORMED CONSENT & COMPETENCY 
FOR PATIENTS WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA & 
ANOSOGNOSIA 
Abstract: Anosognosia is a common symptom of schizophrenia and schizoaffec-
tive disorder that renders individuals unable to understand that they are living 
with a disease. This symptom often leads people to refuse anti-psychotic medica-
tion, and may increase an individual’s likelihood of becoming homeless or incar-
cerated. When courts find individuals to be a danger to others or themselves, 
states can impose involuntary commitment. When a state grants involuntary 
commitment, however, a court may find the individual remains competent to re-
fuse medication. This Note argues that documented anosognosia requires a find-
ing of incompetency, whether people are a danger to themselves or not. Science 
suggests that a person with severe anosognosia lacks the insight to refuse treat-
ment. This Note proposes a novel statutory definition of competency, encompass-
ing the specific needs of people with anosognosia, and grapples with the signifi-
cant interests at stake in taking away an individual’s right to choose or refuse 
treatment, including antipsychotic medication. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are in your second year of college.1 You know you have a se-
rious mental illness, but have agreed to take daily medication to manage your 
symptoms. For the first few months, you check in with your family and keep 
them updated on your condition, therapy, and medications. After several suc-
cessful months on medication, you know that you can control your own symp-
                                                                                                                           
 1 The introduction’s story is adapted from Ron Powers’ historical novel and memoir that details 
his sons’ struggles with mental illness, which is exacerbated by anosognosia, a symptom of mental 
illness that makes it difficult for individuals to see that they are sick. See RON POWERS, NO ONE 
CARES ABOUT CRAZY PEOPLE: THE CHAOS AND HEARTBREAK OF MENTAL HEALTH IN AMERICA 
26–27, 292–95 (2017) (defining anosognosia and describing the author’s experience of trying to help 
his son accept treatment for schizoaffective disorder after deciding to stop taking his medication). 
There are many other documented accounts of individuals who have anosognosia. See generally XA-
VIER AMADOR, I AM NOT SICK I DON’T NEED HELP! HOW TO HELP SOMEONE WITH MENTAL ILL-
NESS ACCEPT TREATMENT (10th ed. 2012) (offering a step-by-step approach for people attempting to 
help individuals accept treatment); Abigail Jones, What Schizophrenia Does to Families, WASH. POST 
MAG., (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/magazine/2020/01/13/what-schizophrenia-
does-families-why-mental-health-system-cant-keep-up/?arc404=true [https://perma.cc/G3HR-XX8Z] 
(describing a family’s struggle with its son’s diagnosis of schizophrenia and his challenges over the 
years). In fact, one study found that more than half of people with schizophrenia have no awareness of 
their illness. AMADOR, supra, at 13.  
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toms and no longer need your medication. You stop taking your medication 
because everything is fine and you do not have any kind of mental illness—
who is your family to tell you something about your own condition? Your 
family visits, reminds you that you have a mental illness, and begs you to get 
back on your medication. You refuse because you know you do not have an 
illness. Your doctor finds that you are competent to refuse treatment because 
you can understand the risks and benefits of the treatment, even though you 
cannot see you are sick.2 You refuse medication, and eventually, you must drop 
out of college due to your lack of control over your symptoms. Because you 
are refusing medication, your family cannot help you find a way out of the sit-
uation. You are not violent, so the state cannot impose involuntary commit-
ment.3 But you eventually become homeless, disconnected from family, and 
experience worsening symptoms because of the lack of medication.4 
This representative story is an example of the effects of anosognosia, a 
symptom of schizophrenia, on a person with mental illness.5 Anosognosia 
causes individuals to lack insight into their own condition.6 Anosognosia leads 
individuals to feel as though there is nothing wrong with them, and may in-
crease the likelihood of refusing medication, becoming homeless, or being ar-
rested.7 As one scholar wrote: “As if the symptoms of schizophrenia were not 
devastating enough in themselves, nature has added a cruel joke, a seemingly 
valueless yet powerful barrier between the sufferer and professionals reaching 
out to help. The cruel joke is called anosognosia.”8 
Beyond the personal effects of anosognosia, the symptom can have im-
portant legal implications as well.9 For example, informed consent occurs 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See infra notes 139–161 (summarizing different theories of competency to give informed con-
sent, which may require a person to understand the risks and benefits of a particular treatment before 
declining to give informed consent). 
 3 See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., Civil Commitment and the Mental 
Health Care Continuum: Historical Trends and Principles for Law and Practice 3–4 (2019), https://
www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/civil-commitment-continuum-of-care.pdf [https://perma.cc/8B9W-
7DSR]. Although some states have started to use other standards for involuntary treatment, historical-
ly, patients have had to be a danger to themselves or others to be committed. See id. at 8 (tracing the 
history of the dangerousness requirement, and noting that some states have adopted new standards, 
such as a showing that an individual may suffer a “serious emotional injury” if they are not commit-
ted). 
 4 See M. Carmela Epright, Coercing Future Freedom: Consent and Capacities for Autonomous 
Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 799, 805 (2010) (suggesting that treatment can improve an individu-
al’s lack of insight, a symptom of the disease). 
 5 Anosognosia, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/learn-more/mental-
health-conditions/related-conditions/anosognosia [https://perma.cc/BFU8-K7GQ]. 
 6 Id. 
 7 AMADOR, supra note 1, at 39 (describing anosognosia as “unawareness of deficits, symptoms, 
or signs of illness”); Anosognosia, supra note 5. 
 8 POWERS, supra note 1, at 26–27. 
 9 See infra Part II (outlining that courts may apply competency statutes to people with anosogno-
sia differently than to those who do not suffer from the symptom). 
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when a patient either accepts or declines treatment, following a doctor’s expla-
nation of risks involved in the procedure.10 In order for a patient to give in-
formed consent, a doctor must first find that the patient is competent.11 Gener-
ally, the law presumes that adults are competent to give informed consent.12 A 
number of factors influence a competency determination, including the per-
son’s ability to comprehend the information the doctor shares, apply the infor-
mation to his or her own circumstances, and rationally make the decision to 
consent or refuse to consent.13 Although it may seem logical that a person who 
cannot see his or her illness cannot give informed consent, as he or she lacks 
any awareness of the illness, the law is inconsistent—in some jurisdictions, 
denial of illness warrants incompetency, but in others, it does not.14 
This Note explores the challenges of developing a legal solution to this is-
sue. Part I of this Note discusses the modern approaches to informed consent, 
the constitutional requirement of patient autonomy, the challenges of schizo-
phrenia and anosognosia, and the history of the U.S. mental health system.15 
Part II examines differing opinions of the application of existing informed con-
sent and competency law to patients with anosognosia.16 Part III argues that 
specific reform of the statutory definition of competency is necessary to ensure 
that the legal system is in sync with the science available today.17 
I. PATIENT AUTONOMY AND SCHIZOPHRENIA: A HISTORY 
The United States has a complex relationship with the treatment of people 
with mental illness.18 Initially, states separated people with mental illness from 
the general population and forced them into asylums, sometimes subjected to 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 11 See infra notes 132–136 and accompanying text (explaining that incompetent patients cannot 
make decisions about their treatment). 
 12 STEVEN E. PEGALIS, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 4:1 (3d ed. 2019). 
 13 See infra notes 138–164 and accompanying text (describing statutory elements of a competen-
cy determination). 
 14 See Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. L. REV. 945, 977 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment] (explaining that decisions regarding treatment competency 
“ha[ve] received little attention in the law”); see also Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Medica-
tion: Revisiting the Role of Denial of Mental Illness in Capacity Determinations, 22 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
SOC. JUST. 167, 170 (2013) [hereinafter Saks, Revisiting the Role of Denial of Mental Illness in Ca-
pacity Determinations] (describing the varied judicial approaches to determining capacity for patients 
with mental illness). 
 15 See infra Part I. 
 16 See infra Part II. 
 17 See infra Part III. 
 18 See generally E. FULLER TORREY, AMERICAN PSYCHOSIS: HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
DESTROYED THE MENTAL ILLNESS TREATMENT SYSTEM (2014) (explaining how the federal govern-
ment treated individuals with mental illnesses from the early twentieth century through the early 
2000s). 
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abuse under the guise of treatment.19 Beginning in the 1950s, however, patients 
were released from these facilities, and often left without any support from the 
government or medical professionals.20 Today, individuals with mental illness 
have a variety of options for treatment, although remnants of historical treat-
ment styles—such as involuntary commitment—still exist.21 
Section A of this Part provides a brief history of the U.S. mental health 
system, including institutionalization, deinstitutionalization, and the evolution 
of antipsychotic medication.22 Section B describes schizophrenia, one type of 
serious mental illness.23 Section C of this Part explains the informed consent 
doctrine.24 In addition, Section C outlines different standards and approaches 
for competency determinations, a prerequisite for informed consent.25 Finally, 
Section D explains involuntary and voluntary treatment methods available for 
individuals with schizophrenia and other types of serious mental illness.26 
A. Mental Illness in the United States: A Brief History 
Since the 1400s scholars have documented the housing of people with 
mental illness at in-patient facilities.27 Institutionalization began in the United 
States in the 1750s, with the creation of America’s first hospital, Philadelphia 
Hospital.28 A general hospital, Philadelphia Hospital treated some mentally ill 
patients in its basement.29 A number of other hospitals for people with mental 
illness opened after Philadelphia Hospital.30 In 1841, a British reformer, Dor-
othea Dix, toured hospitals across the United States to understand the patients’ 
conditions and determine potential fixes to the system.31 Appalled by the atroc-
                                                                                                                           
 19 See infra notes 27–64 and accompanying text. 
 20 TORREY, supra note 18, at 33. 
 21 See infra Part I.D. 
 22 See infra Part I.A. 
 23 See infra Part I.B. 
 24 See infra Part I.C. 
 25 See infra Part I.C. 
 26 See infra Part I.D. 
 27 POWERS, supra note 1, at 59–61. Bethlem, the first documented asylum in England, is notorious 
for atrocities it committed against its patients. Id. Staff at Bethlem treated patients less than humanely, 
sometimes beating, shackling, or chaining them to the walls of the building. Id. at 62. 
 28 Id. at 67. 
 29 Id. “Institutionalization” refers to the theory underlying the early treatment of people with men-
tal illness. Id. at 67–76. During this time, states housed people living with mental illness in facilities. 
Id. at 68. The time period of institutionalization reflected a growing fear of “madness” among U.S. 
citizens. Id. at 69. For example, on Sundays at Philadelphia Hospital, people from the town could go 
to the hospital and watch the patients, who were in horrible condition. Id. at 68. The individuals were 
treated as entertainment, not patients. See id. 
 30 POWERS, supra note 1, at 68. 
 31 Id. at 66–72. Dorothea Dix was essential to the establishment of care for people with mental 
illness in the United States. See Manon S. Parry, Dorothea Dix (1802–1887), 94 AM. PUB. HEALTH 
ASS’N 622, 624 (2004), https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/epub/10.2105/AJPH.2005.079152 [https://
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ities she witnessed, including men and women with mental illness restrained 
by shackles and beaten, Dix founded thirty-two additional facilities across the 
United States between 1841 and 1880 in an attempt to expand access and pro-
vide better, less crowded treatment to patients.32 Although an admirable at-
tempt to fix the system, these facilities did little to rectify the horrors that oc-
curred at the earlier state-sponsored centers.33 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, mental health reformers aimed to create a 
federal mental health program to fix the shortcomings of the state-sponsored 
facilities through an overhaul of the system.34 To encourage new research and 
changes to the mental health system, Congress passed a bill establishing the 
bipartisan Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health (the Joint Commis-
sion).35 The Joint Commission called for the end of state psychiatric facilities, 
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/68FK-9X98]. Famously, Dix submitted a report to the Legislature of Massachusetts regard-
ing the state of asylums in the Commonwealth. Id. at 622. Dix called upon the legislature to make 
changes to the state of these facilities, citing her notes from the visits to the institutions. See id. at 
622–23. Notably, she argued for legislation to address the problems at the facilities, stating: “It is the 
Commonwealth, not its integral parts, that is accountable for most of the abuses . . . . I repeat it, it is 
defective legislation which perpetuates and multiples these abuses.” Id. at 623 (quoting DOROTHEA 
DIX, MEMORIAL TO THE LEGISLATURE OF MASSACHUSETTS (Boston, Munroe & Francis 1843)). 
Specifically, Dix noted that she saw men and women with mental illness “chained, naked, beaten with 
rods, and lashed into obedience.” Id. (quoting DIX, supra (emphasis removed)).  
 32 POWERS, supra note 1, at 66–72. See generally Parry, supra note 31 (explaining Dorothea 
Dix’s tour). 
 33 POWERS, supra note 1, at 75 (explaining that although the atrocities at the new asylums were 
not as horrible as those in earlier facilities, problems remained). Americans became more aware of the 
horrors of state mental health facilities with the publication in Life Magazine of Bedlam 1946: Most 
U.S. Mental Hospitals Are a Shame and Disgrace. See ESMÉ WEIJUN WANG, THE COLLECTED 
SCHIZOPHRENIAS 106 (2018) (describing the impact of the Life Magazine article on the American 
psyche); see also Albert Q. Maisel, Bedlam 1946: Most U.S. Mental Hospitals Are a Shame and a 
Disgrace, LIFE MAG., May 6, 1946, at 102. The article described these facilities as “little more than 
concentration camps on the Belsen pattern.” Maisel, supra, at 102; see also WANG, supra, at 106 (de-
scribing the Life Magazine article). Not only did the article include descriptions of the facilities, the 
article also included pictures. Maisel, supra, at 103–12; see also E. FULLER TORREY, NOWHERE TO 
GO: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 2 (1988) (suggesting that the pictures 
carried even more impact than the text of the article). Arguably, showing the public these haunting 
images contributed to the rejection of asylums in the 1950s. See TORREY, supra, at 2–4. 
 34 TORREY, supra note 18, at 30. Many stakeholders supported the creation of a federal mental 
health plan, including the American Psychiatric Association and then-Senator John F. Kennedy. Id. 
One notable reformer was Dr. Robert H. Felix, a member of the U.S. Public Health Service. Id. at 17. 
Felix aimed to reform the U.S. mental health system through an out-patient program that would re-
place the current state system. Id. Felix was the first director of the National Institute of Mental Health 
(NIMH) and shaped the community-based program later adopted in the United States. Id. 
 35 See id. at 30. (describing the creation of the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health 
(the Joint Commission)). Thirty-six different “participating agencies” comprised the Joint Commis-
sion. Id. Notable stakeholders included the American Academy of Neurology, the U.S. Department of 
Justice, the American Medical Association, and the American Academy of Pediatrics, among many 
others. Id. at 30–31. After several public hearings regarding the best way forward for a federal mental 
health program in the United States, the Joint Commission obtained an increase in the NIMH budget. 
Id. at 31. 
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which it referred to as “bankrupt beyond remedy.”36 In addition to monetary 
aid, the Joint Commission sought to implement community-based clinics to 
replace the state facilities.37 The medical professionals at these clinics aimed to 
find and treat people with mental illness early in the progression of their dis-
ease, and in the community, without forcing the patients into facilities.38 At the 
time of the Joint Commission’s creation, reformers proposed federal grants to 
states for the creation of these community mental health programs.39 
Antipsychotic medications also began to appear in the 1950s.40 The first 
medication was chlorpromazine, which helped to reduce side effects of psy-
chosis by decreasing the positive symptoms of schizophrenia.41 Some experts 
saw that the new medications could provide an opportunity for patients to be 
deinstitutionalized by helping to moderate the most obviously severe symp-
toms.42 In addition, after doctors and researchers introduced medications, state 
hospitals could use less invasive tactics.43 Although some heralded these early 
antipsychotics—often referred to as “first-generation” antipsychotics—for 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Id. at 44. Most notably, the Joint Commission’s report suggested that immense federal funding 
would be required to help states treat their citizens living with mental illness. Id. at 32. 
 37 Id. at 20. The goal of these community treatment centers was to give patients treatment in the 
community, rather than in facilities. Id. In addition, these centers were focused on prevention. TOR-
REY, supra note 33, at 69. Dr. Felix aimed to provide “one out-patient mental health clinic for each 
100,000 of the population.” TORREY, supra note 18, at 21. President Kennedy stated that the goal of 
these community health centers was replacing “reliance on the cold mercy of custodial isolation” with 
“the open warmth of community concern and capability.” Id. at 55. (quoting President John F. Kenne-
dy, Special Message on Mental Illness and Mental Retardation, (Feb. 5, 1963)). 
 38 TORREY, supra note 18, at 20. Federal community health centers opened in 1966, and were 
required to offer five services to patients: “inpatient beds, partial hospitalization beds, 24-hour emer-
gency evaluations, outpatient services, and consultation/education.” Id. at 62. In 1974, an additional 
seven services were added to the program including patient screening before patients were admitted to 
hospitals, care for patients following release from hospitals, new facilities for patients recently re-
leased from hospitals, and four special programs, one each for children, the elderly, people with drug 
addiction, and people with alcohol addiction. Id. at 84. 
 39 Id. at 24. 
 40 Id. at 32; see Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the “Chemical Straitjacket”: The Legal Signifi-
cance of Recent Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1033, 1063–64 (2002) (“Before the introduction of chlorpromazine in 1953, most individuals with 
schizophrenia were destined to spend their entire adult lives within large, often remote psychiatric 
hospitals.” (quoting Donald C. Goff, A 23-Year-Old Man with Schizophrenia, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
3249, 3256 (2002))). 
 41 Mossman, supra note 40, at 1062–63. Positive symptoms are “additional behaviors not gener-
ally seen in healthy people.” NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, SCHIZOPHRENIA 2 (2019), https://www.
nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/schizophrenia/19-mh-8082-schizophrenia_155669.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8MDS-KAGY]. Positive symptoms include hallucinations, delusions, thought disorders, and 
movement disorders. Id.; see infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (discussing positive and nega-
tive symptoms). 
 42 Mossman, supra note 40, at 1065 (explaining how new medications facilitated deinstitutionali-
zation). 
 43 See id. at 1064–65 (comparing the lives of individuals in mental facilities before and after the 
introduction of antipsychotic medications). 
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their ability to help quell symptoms, they had significant drawbacks for pa-
tients.44 First, the antipsychotics did not have a high rate of success.45 Second, 
the antipsychotics from this time period often carried extreme side effects, 
such as “stiffness, diminished facial expression, tremors, and restlessness.”46 
The side effects caused many people to stop using the drugs.47 
Thus, deinstitutionalization began in 1956.48 Patients at state and federal 
mental health facilities were discharged, largely in response to the new federal 
programming and bolstered by the promise of new medications for people with 
severe mental illness.49 The federal program caused many asylums to close, and 
promoted replacing them with community mental health centers.50 Some schol-
ars argued that closing the facilities was a win for patients.51 Asylums would no 
longer subject individuals to the documented horrors of under-educated staff and 
inhumane conditions.52 In addition, deinstitutionalization allowed individual pa-
tients who had full insight into their condition, moderate symptoms, and familial 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See id. at 1068–69 (explaining that these novel antipsychotics had negative side effects for 
patients); see also E. FULLER TORREY, SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA: A FAMILY MANUAL 183 (6th ed. 
2013) (explaining that antipsychotics introduced prior to 1990 are referred to as “first-generation”). 
 45 Mossman, supra note 40, at 1068–69. 
 46 Id. These side effects are problematic because they can be permanent. Id. at 1069. In addition, 
patients may experience weight gain and an increase in blood sugar content, which can lead to diabe-
tes. TORREY, supra note 44, at 185. 
 47 Mossman, supra note 40, at 1068–69. Noncompliance rates with these earlier medications were 
as high as 40%. Id.  
 48 TORREY, supra note 18, at 33. “Deinstitutionalization” refers to the process of releasing pa-
tients with mental illness from state hospitals. Id. In 1955, 558,922 people with mental illness lived in 
state facilities. Id. The following year, 7,532 fewer people lived in these facilities. Id. This decrease in 
patients in facilities was the first in more than one hundred years. Id. Even before the government 
officially implemented the federal community health program, states began to create their own outpa-
tient programs. Id. at 52. President Kennedy officially signed the federal program into legislation in 
October 1963. Id. at 58. 
 49 Id. at 32–33 (describing the impact of antipsychotic medications on deinstitutionalization). 
 50 See id. at 44 (summarizing the decision making involved in reducing the number of state-
sponsored asylums). Although there was a strong push to close U.S. asylums, those advocating on 
behalf of the closures had little experience working in state facilities, and did not propose fixing what 
already existed. Id. In 1961, Gerald Caplan published An Approach to Community Mental Health, 
which accelerated acceptance of community mental health centers. Id. at 46. In addition, people de-
veloped other groups to help individuals with mental illness, such as “Schizophrenics Anonymous” 
and “Recovery Inc.” Id. at 94.  
 51 Id. at 44–45, 94. 
 52 See id. at 93 (explaining that releasing patients from facilities was “logical and humane”). Ar-
guably, deinstitutionalization was the first attempt in U.S. history to bring individuals with mental 
illness into society, representing a shift in opinions regarding those with these illnesses. Leonard S. 
Rubenstein, Reflections on Freedom, Abandonment, and Deinstitutionalization, in CHOICE & RE-
SPONSIBILITY: LEGAL AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN SERVICES FOR PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILI-
TIES 53, 58 (Clarence J. Sundram ed., 1994). For the first time, these individuals were “suddenly to be 
brought not only into light, but also into the neighborhood.” Id. 
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support the opportunity to thrive.53 Other scholars, however, criticized the com-
munity-based programs as under-researched and under-planned by, for example, 
not determining where released patients would live and how these programs 
would handle patients who refused to accept treatment.54 
In 1980, President Ronald Regan overhauled the government’s response 
to the mental health crisis by implementing block grant funding to the states.55 
                                                                                                                           
 53 TORREY, supra note 18, at 94. Furthermore, some patients also were released to areas that had 
strong programs for rehabilitation. Id. One restaurant, the Eden Express, offered a program for people 
with mental illness to learn to cook and work in the restaurant business. Id. From 1980 to 1999, the 
program worked with seven hundred people with mental illness. Id. 80% of individuals who enrolled 
in the program completed it. Id. Of those who completed the training, 94% went on to find jobs. Id. 
 54 Id. at 57 (explaining that no researchers conducted studies demonstrating that the community 
approach would prevent mental illness or catch the progression of the disease early). The program 
Congress passed had a number of issues, including focusing on prevention without authoritative sci-
ence available at the time to understand how psychiatric diseases developed, closing state-sponsored 
facilities without clear plans for where patients discharged from the facilities would reside, and failing 
to provide a path forward for coordination between the federal and state governments. See id. at 58–59 
(explaining the flaws of the community mental health center plan). In Justice Anthony Kennedy’s 
1999 concurrence in the Supreme Court case Olmstead v. L.C., he raised concerns regarding deinstitu-
tionalization. See 527 U.S. 581, 609 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Olmstead consid-
ered the antidiscrimination provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Id. at 587 (ma-
jority opinion). Quoting E. Fuller Torrey, an expert on mental illness, Justice Kennedy noted that the 
“self-determination” granted to individuals with mental illness by deinstitutionalization may only 
mean “that the person has a choice of soup kitchens,” due to the lack of structural support offered by 
the government to these patients. Id. at 609 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting E. FULLER 
TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS 11 (1997)). Justice Kennedy was concerned that, for those with seri-
ous mental illness and without any treatment, “the most dreaded of confinements can be the impris-
onment inflicted by his own mind, which shuts reality out and subjects him to the torment of voices 
and images beyond our own powers to describe.” Id. at 609–10. 
 55 TORREY, supra note 33, at 197. Block grants are a type of federal funding that “allow the states 
to allocate federal funds among competing programs that fall under the same subject heading.” Janet 
Varon, Passing the Bucks: Procedural Protections Under Federal Block Grants, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 231, 236 (1983). Unlike other methods of federal funding, block grants provide states the 
opportunity to “design programs, define eligibility, criteria, or even eliminate a program,” so long as 
the funding is used within the broad definition of the federal grant. Id. Critics of block grants empha-
size that this type of funding can have an adverse impact on lower-income individuals for two primary 
reasons. Id. at 232. First, in tandem with the choice to use block grants for funding, Congress may 
actually decrease the amount of funding given to states, leaving states unable to effectively implement 
critical programs. Id. Second, if Congress uses block grants, it is unlikely that there will be federal 
regulations in place that act “as a shield to protect poor groups and regions which may need services 
but have comparatively little political influence.” Id. The community-based program was already 
suffering prior to President Reagan’s tenure. TORREY, supra note 33, at 181. From 1970 to 1972, 
President Richard Nixon repeatedly attempted to cutback funding to the programs. Id. at 184. During 
his presidency from 1977 to 1981, President James “Jimmy” Carter tried to help people with mental 
illness by creating a new program, the Community Support Program, but did not attempt to fix the 
existing program. Id. at 194–95; see James Carter, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
about-the-white-house/presidents/james-carter/ [https://perma.cc/P2EW-PQJM] (providing details of 
President Carter’s tenure). In 1981, President Reagan implemented federal block grants in the Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act, aiming to encourage the states to take control of their own program-
ming. TORREY, supra note 33, at 197. These block grants, however, constituted less than 5% of the 
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When Congress first introduced the community-based program, it told the 
states that the federal community health centers would replace the state mental 
hospitals.56 States closed their facilities in reliance upon the federal program.57 
But without the federal funding, the states could not uphold the community-
based programs.58 The changes in funding essentially ended the community-
based program, which created organizational challenges for state programs and 
federal programs to work in tandem.59 
Scholars argue that the policy decision to release patients into the com-
munity for community-based treatment failed to consider scientific evidence 
that many individuals lacked insight into their condition.60 Patients without 
insight arguably needed caretaker and facility structure to remain compliant 
with medication.61 Although community-based treatments allowed patients to 
interact with society, patients who needed medications did not always have the 
resources and support necessary to continue their medical treatment.62 
Deinstitutionalization also correlated with an increase in the number of 
incarcerated mentally ill individuals.63 The percentage of people with serious 
mental illnesses in prisons rose from 5% in the 1970s to between 20% and 
40% in 2012.64 In California, for example, studies demonstrated that there was 
                                                                                                                           
total federal funding for people with mental illness, giving the states little means to maintain commu-
nity programs. Id. at 198.  
 56 TORREY, supra note 18, at 88–89. 
 57 Id. at 89–90. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See David L. Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and the Adversary Process, 
75 COLUM. L. REV. 897, 907 (1975) (describing the “folly” of removing patients from state facilities 
without first ensuring proper funding and support at community health centers); see also TORREY, 
supra note 18, at 90 (describing the fatal flaw of the original federal mental health program to coordi-
nate with state governments). Dr. Felix, the creator of the community-based program stated, in 1984, 
that the “result [of the community-based program] is not what we intended.” TORREY, supra note 18, 
at 17. 
 60 See, e.g., Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons Are Brim-Full of the Mentally Ill: Is Their Incarceration 
a Solution or a Sign of Failure?, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 157, 176 (2000) (explaining the short-
comings of plans to release patients from psychiatric hospitals into communities). 
 61 See id. (suggesting that many patients with mental illness require more structure in their treat-
ment plans to succeed). 
 62 Id.; see Bazelon, supra note 59, at 908 (“The real problem is that deinstitutionalization also 
represents a ‘standardized response’ to a multitude of individual problems . . . . not all patients will be 
helped by autonomy in the community.”). 
 63 See Stavis, supra note 60, at 176 (“These individuals, rather than being the metaphorical ‘pris-
oners of psychiatry’ . . . are increasingly becoming real prisoners of our nation’s jails.”). 
 64 TORREY, supra note 18, at 117. Prisoners with mental illness tend to have longer stays in cor-
rectional institutions than other prisoners. Id. at 118. At Rikers Island in New York, the average prison 
stay is forty-two days for individuals without mental illness. Id. For prisoners with mental illness, 
however, the average stay is 215 days. Id. Prisoners victimize those with mental illness more than 
others. See id. at 119. One study determined that one out of twelve male prisoners with mental illness 
reported “sexual victimization” in a six-month period, although only one in thirty-three male prisoners 
without mental illness reported victimization in the same period. Id. Finally, prisoners with mental 
illness are significantly more expensive to house than prisoners without mental illness. Id. A 2007 
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a significant uptick in people with mental illness in state prisons from the early 
1970s to the early 2000s.65 Closing the facilities in California meant many pa-
tients became homeless, and eventually ended up in jail.66 Today, it is more 
probable that a person with mental illness will receive treatment if incarcerated 
than if attempting to find treatment in a mental health facility or hospital.67 
Many individuals who receive treatment in jails have severe mental ill-
ness.68 One form of severe mental illness, and the primary focus of this Note, is 
schizophrenia.69 The following Section discusses schizophrenia in detail, includ-
ing its perception in society, theories of its origin, and symptoms of the disorder, 
including anosognosia, which affects more than fifty percent of patients with 
schizophrenia and causes a severe lack of insight into one’s own mental illness.70 
B. Schizophrenia: A Complex and Multi-Faceted Disease 
Schizophrenia is a widely discussed, and arguably widely misunderstood, 
disease.71 The media frequently characterizes people with schizophrenia as 
                                                                                                                           
study of Florida’s Broward County Jail determined that prisoners with mental illness cost $130 per 
day. Id. In contrast, it cost $80 per day to house prisoners without mental illness. Id. 
 65 Darrell Steinberg et al., STANFORD L. SCH. THREE STRIKES PROJECT, WHEN DID PRISONS 
BECOME ACCEPTABLE MENTAL HEALTHCARE FACILITIES? 2 (2015), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/863745/doc/slspublic/Report_v12.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/A9KG-EXEH]. When California reduced the size and number of its state mental health facilities, 
its legislature planned for the funding formerly used at the state facilities to go toward community 
health programs for these same patients. Id. at 6. The funding never reached the community health 
programs, as then-Governor Ronald Reagan vetoed the change in funding twice, first in 1972 and then 
in 1973. Id. Following the vetoes, the funding was inconsistent, leading to varying degrees of service 
for the patients across the state. Id.  
 66 See Craig Haney, Expert Analysis: The Tragic Case of Mentally Ill Prisoners in California, in 
WHEN DID PRISONS BECOME ACCEPTABLE MENTAL HEALTHCARE FACILITIES?, supra note 65, at 7 
(explaining that people with mental illness tend to have risk factors, like homelessness, that may lead 
to incarceration and that in California “there are almost no public psychiatric beds available for indi-
viduals with serious mental illnesses”); WHEN DID PRISONS BECOME ACCEPTABLE MENTAL 
HEALTHCARE FACILITIES?, supra note 65, at 6; see also TORREY, supra note 18, at 124 (describing 
the increase in the population of homeless individuals with mental illness). Following deinstitutionali-
zation, studies suggest that more than 30% of homeless people have a serious mental illness. TORREY, 
supra note 18, at 124. In a 2010 study of the United States, researchers determined that there are 
650,000 homeless people in the country. Id. Extrapolating from the study, 216,000 of those individu-
als live with a mental illness. Id.  
 67 Haney, supra note 66, at 7. In the United States today, approximately 350,000 prisoners are 
living with mental illness, nearly ten times the population of people with mental illness living in U.S. 
psychiatric facilities. Id. 
 68 See id. (explaining that many patients in prisons are living with mental illness and receiving 
treatment in prisons).  
 69 See infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text (describing schizophrenia). 
 70 See infra Part I.B. 
 71 Schizophrenia is a serious mental illness that alters an individual’s ability to think clearly, feel 
emotion, and conform their behavior to convention. See Schizophrenia, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, 
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/schizophrenia/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/6A32-8TKC]; 
see also TORREY, supra note 44, at 76–89 (describing other psychiatric conditions that people may 
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violent individuals, with symptoms of deviant behavior or hallucinations that 
doctors must treat with electroshock therapy or other antiquated treatments.72 
In reality, however, only a small population of patients are violent, deviant be-
havior and hallucinations are rarer than other symptoms, and antipsychotic 
medication is the modern standard for treatment of the disease.73 
Many theories exist about what causes schizophrenia, including genetics, 
neurochemicals, neurological development, and infection.74 Over time, scien-
tists and other experts have debunked other theories of the disease’s origin, 
such as “bad families” or “evil spirits”.75 Approximately 20,000,000 people 
                                                                                                                           
confuse with schizophrenia); WANG, supra note 33, at 3 (“People speak of schizophrenics as though 
they were dead without being dead, gone in the eyes of those around them.”). 
 72 See Patricia R. Owen, Portrayals of Schizophrenia by Entertainment Media: A Content Analy-
sis of Contemporary Movies, 63 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 655, 655–56 (2012). One study analyzed forty-
two characters with schizophrenia in movies, and found that thirty-five of them engaged in violence. 
Id. at 657. Some refer to this trope of violence as the “homicidal maniac,” which is one of the most 
prevalent stereotypes of people with schizophrenia depicted in movies. Id. at 655. Violent depictions 
of people with schizophrenia in movies may contribute to the public perception that these individuals 
are unsafe. See id. at 658. In addition, people with schizophrenia may be further stigmatized due to 
these inaccurate depictions. See id. 
 73 Id. at 655–56. One study reviewed more than four hundred movies that depicted the treatment 
of schizophrenia. Id. at 656. Of the four hundred movies, only one showed antipsychotic medication 
as the treatment for the disease, although these treatments are considered “first-line” for schizophre-
nia. Id. 
 74 TORREY, supra note 44, at 134–44. Genetic theories suggest that schizophrenia is caused by a 
family’s gene pool. Id. at 134. It is unlikely that genetics alone cause the disorder, however, as an 
identical twin of an individual with schizophrenia has only about a 30% likelihood of having the ill-
ness. Id. This research suggests that other factors contribute to the onset of schizophrenia. Id. Neuro-
chemical theories allege that chemicals in the brain called neurotransmitters cause schizophrenia. Id. 
at 136. For example, some researchers allege that abnormalities in the neurotransmitter dopamine 
causes schizophrenia. Id. Researches believed this theory because early antipsychotics aimed to block 
dopamine to help ameliorate symptoms of the disease. Id. Although schizophrenia impacts neuro-
transmitters, experts debate whether the abnormalities cause the disease or whether they are a symp-
tom. See id. at 137. Developmental theories suggest that an incident during the development of an 
individual’s brain causes schizophrenia. Id. Developmental theories are popular today. Id. Develop-
mental theorists argue that any kind of agent could cause the problem, including drugs, alcohol, medi-
cation, stressful incidents, poor nutrition, genetic abnormalities, or environmental influences. Id. 
These theorists believe that once the developmental incident occurs during brain development, the 
individual is more likely to develop schizophrenia. Id. Infection theories suggest that “infectious 
agents,” in concert with a genetic predisposition toward schizophrenia, cause the disease to manifest 
in an individual. Id. at 138–39. An example of an infectious agent is Toxoplasma gondii, a parasite. Id. 
at 139; see Parasites—Toxoplasmosis (Toxoplasma Infection), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PRE-
VENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/parasites/toxoplasmosis/gen_info/faqs.html [https://perma.cc/U3BJ-
P9QH]. Infection theorists suggest that those infected with these agents who are also predisposed to 
schizophrenia have a strong chance of developing the disease. TORREY, supra note 44, at 139–40. 
 75 TORREY, supra note 44, at 144–47. The “bad families” theory of schizophrenia was prominent 
in the 1950s. Id. at 145. This theory suggested that individuals were more likely to have schizophrenia 
if they were born into families that had poor interactions with one another. Id. Similarly, other theo-
rists suggested that individuals who had families that were too critical, antagonistic, or overbearing 
were more likely to manifest schizophrenia. Id. Scientists debunked this theory, too. Id. The “evil 
spirits” theory refers to the idea that an infestation of “evil spirits” in the mind of the individual with 
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worldwide live with schizophrenia, and it affects roughly 1% of the U.S. adult 
population.76 Schizophrenia is a neurodevelopmental disorder that causes a 
person to have difficulty thinking, feeling, and acting conventionally.77 Alt-
hough the root of the word “schizophrenia” comes from Greek words meaning 
“a mind that is divided or torn apart,” split personality is a different, less com-
mon, psychiatric condition.78 There is no singular symptom that is considered the 
hallmark of schizophrenia.79 Historically, doctors characterized schizophrenia by 
delusions, hallucinations, and disorganized speech or behavior.80 New research, 
however, has revealed a plethora of symptoms of the disease, which fall into 
two categories: positive symptoms and negative symptoms.81 Positive symp-
toms are those that add to a patient’s personality or affect, and negative symp-
toms are those that cause a person with schizophrenia to withdraw from social 
interaction.82 
Schizophrenia typically manifests in early adulthood.83 The disease is 
challenging to diagnose, as symptoms may come and go.84 The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) provides the criteria for a diag-
nosis of schizophrenia in the United States.85 Due to the disease’s stigma and 
                                                                                                                           
the disease causes schizophrenia. Id. In some parts of the world, people still believe this theory is 
accurate. Id. 
 76 Schizophrenia, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/
schizophrenia [https://perma.cc/39NU-PF2J]; see also WANG, supra note 33, at 4 (describing the 
prevalence of schizophrenia). 
 77 NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 41. Neurodevelopmental disorders are a group of 
disorders that have symptoms of brain impairment and are characterized by patients having difficulty 
communicating and behaving. A.P. Mullin et al., Neurodevelopmental Disorders: Mechanisms and 
Boundary Definitions from Genomes, Interactomes and Proteomes, TRANSLATIONAL PSYCHIATRY, 
2013, at 1, 1. Included in the group is autism spectrum disorder, schizophrenia, and attention defi-
cit/hyperactivity disorder. Id.  
 78 Mossman, supra note 40, at 1046; see also TORREY, supra note 44, at 75–76. 
 79 TORREY, supra note 44, at 59. 
 80 Douglas Mossman & Jill L. Steinberg, Promoting, Prescribing, and Pushing Pills: Under-
standing the Lessons of Antipsychotic Drug Litigation, 13 MICH. STATE U. J. MED. & L. 263, 269 
(2009). 
 81 NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 41. 
 82 Id. Positive symptoms need not be present at all times, and may increase or decrease over the 
lifespan of the individual with schizophrenia. See id. Some refer to positive symptoms as “psychotic 
symptoms.” Dora W. Klein, When Coercion Lacks Care: Competency to Make Medical Treatment 
Decisions and Parens Patriae Civil Commitments, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 581 (2012). Nega-
tive symptoms include difficulty following through with plans, lacking facial affects, having trouble 
feeling happiness, speaking infrequently, and struggling with decision-making. Mossman & Stein-
berg, supra note 80, at 269. 
 83 Mossman & Steinberg, supra note 80, at 269; see also ELYN R. SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT 
HOLD: MY JOURNEY THROUGH MADNESS 34–35 (2007) (describing the author’s schizophrenia onset 
as a student at Vanderbilt University). 
 84 TORREY, supra note 44, at 61. 
 85 See id. To encompass all the different ways in which schizophrenia may manifest, the Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) includes a list of positive and negative symp-
toms and other criteria for a clinician to diagnose the disease appropriately. Id.; AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
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its painful history, clinicians will not give a diagnosis until they are certain it is 
schizophrenia.86 Clinicians require symptoms of the disease to occur for at 
least six months before making a diagnosis of schizophrenia.87 This waiting 
period is different from typical diagnostic practice, and reflects the seriousness 
of the disease and the implications of the diagnosis.88 
Currently, no medication or treatment can cure schizophrenia.89 All treat-
ments available only help alleviate symptoms.90 Antipsychotic medication is 
the only successful treatment method for active, positive symptoms of schizo-
phrenia, and negative symptoms remain difficult to treat.91 Research suggests 
                                                                                                                           
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 99–105 (5th ed. 2013). The 
DSM-V, the most recent iteration of the manual, lists the following requirements for schizophrenia, as 
related in Surviving Schizophrenia: A Family Manual: 
A. Two or more of the following symptoms must be present for a significant portion of 
time during a one-month period. 
  1.delusions 
  2. hallucinations 
  3. disorganized speech 
  4. catatonia or other grossly abnormal psychomotor behavior 
  5. “negative” symptoms, e.g. restricted affect, asociality 
B. Significant decreased function at work, in interpersonal relations, or in self-care. 
C. At least one month of active symptoms (criteria A) unless successfully treated and 
at least six months of all symptoms (prodromal, active, and residual). 
D. Does not meet criteria for schizoaffective disorder, and symptoms of psychosis are 
not caused by substance abuse. 
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra, 99–105; TORREY, supra note 44, at 61. 
 86 See TORREY, supra note 44, at 61 (referring to the historically negative implications of a schiz-
ophrenia diagnosis, and emphasizing the care doctors must take in diagnosing people with the dis-
ease). 
 87 See id. In the past, clinicians were too eager to give a schizophrenia diagnosis, and individuals 
with other disorders were wrongfully diagnosed. Id. 
 88 See id. (describing the process for obtaining a schizophrenia diagnosis). In practice, when a 
clinician first suspects that a patient may have schizophrenia, the clinician writes “rule out schizo-
phrenia” in the patient notes. Id. This is an indefinite diagnosis, which allows the clinician to further 
observe the patient until a diagnosis can be confirmed. See id. Schizophrenia diagnoses rely heavily 
on the subjective observations of clinicians. Id. at 62. There is no objective test for schizophrenia. See 
id. (explaining that there is no blood or other test that would diagnose the disease with certainty). 
 89 Klein, supra note 82, at 581. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 582. Negative symptoms, such as a lack of affect or motivation, do not respond as well to 
antipsychotic medication as positive symptoms. Mossman & Steinberg, supra note 80, at 274 n.55. 
Historically, researchers theorized that negative symptoms would not be responsive to medication. 
Gary Remington et al., Treating Negative Symptoms in Schizophrenia: An Update, CURRENT TREAT-
MENT OPTIONS PSYCHIATRY, June 2016, at 133, 135. Although researchers have tried numerous dif-
ferent treatments for negative symptoms, no treatment has conclusively been successful to date. Id. at 
144. Doctors are conducting trials to determine whether antidepressant medications are effective to 
treat negative symptoms. Id. at 136. One potential reason for the failure of these studies is the difficul-
ty of differentiating between negative symptoms of schizophrenia and other secondary conditions, like 
depression. Id. at 144. Scientists recognize that the treatment of negative symptoms is an “unmet 
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that leaving positive symptoms untreated may make future treatment less suc-
cessful.92 Medication, however, may not have the same results in each pa-
tient.93 Some patients may experience a complete dissipation of symptoms, 
while others may see little to no change.94 Although clinicians often consider 
antipsychotic medications as critical for the treatment of schizophrenia, thera-
py can also be beneficial.95 Those who attend therapy may be more likely to 
take their medication, and may have lower rates of relapse or hospitalization.96 
It is not uncommon for a person with severe mental illness to deny his or 
her diagnosis.97 But simple denial, which may be considered a “coping mecha-
nism,” is different from anosognosia, a researched symptom of schizophre-
nia.98 Anosognosia is a symptom that causes patients to lack insight into their 
                                                                                                                           
need” in the field, however, pathways to successfully identifying treatments remain unclear. Id. at 
145. 
 92 See Klein, supra note 82, at 582–83 (explaining the dangers of leaving symptoms of schizo-
phrenia untreated for long periods of time). 
 93 Id. at 581. 
 94 See id. (describing the different effects antipsychotic medications may have on patients). Scien-
tists discovered clozapine in 1989, marking a major development in schizophrenia treatment. Moss-
man, supra note 40, at 1069–70. Unlike chlorpromazine, clozapine does not cause extreme side effects 
and is effective for a larger percentage of patients. Id. at 1068, 1070–71. Clozapine does carry a risk, 
however, of causing a potentially fatal blood disorder, which means patients must undergo monitoring 
and testing. Id. at 1070–71. Clozapine and its progeny are often referred to as “second-generation” 
antipsychotics; although other medications have become available, clozapine is still referred to as the 
“gold standard” of medication for schizophrenia. TORREY, supra note 44, at 183, 191–93. Clinicians 
developed an alternative method for the administration of medications for psychosis, which requires a 
periodic injection of antipsychotic medication. POWERS, supra note 1, at 27. Colloquially referred to 
as the “depot” method, it requires individuals to come to a treatment center periodically to receive 
their dosage in one deposit, rather than requiring patients to take an oral medication daily. Id. The 
phrase comes from French, with “depot” referring to the “place of deposit.” Id. Typically, the medica-
tion is administered monthly. Id. at 28. The results of this method of treatment are mixed. Id. In one 
study, the use of the depot method reduced medication relapse. Id. A different study determined, how-
ever, that the depot method offered no strong benefit to patients. Id. Although these studies present 
mixed results, this treatment method may be useful for patients with a lack of insight into their condi-
tion, who may agree to take medication one day and reach a different conclusion on another day. See 
id. at 27. 
 95 See Elizabeth Bennion, A Right to Remain Psychotic? A New Standard for Involuntary Treat-
ment, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 282 (2013) (explaining treatment options for schizophrenia). 
 96 Id. 
 97 See AMADOR, supra note 1, at 34–35 (discussing the possibility that patients may be refusing 
medication as a coping mechanism for their diagnosis). 
 98 See Bennion, supra note 95, at 291 (explaining anosognosia); TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., SE-
RIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS AND ANOSOGNOSIA (2016), https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/
storage/documents/backgrounders/smi-and-anosognosia.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY2C-JA49] (describ-
ing the difference between anosognosia and denial). Anosognosia is caused by anatomy and “physical 
damage to the brain.” TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., supra, at 1. Denial, however, is psychological. Id. 
As of 2016, twenty-two studies have considered whether there are physical differences in the brain of 
people with schizophrenia suffering from anosognosia and those without the symptom. Id. at 2. Twen-
ty of the twenty-two studies found “significant differences” in the structure of the brain of those with 
anosognosia. Id. Notably, three studies only tested people with schizophrenia who had never been 
treated by medication, decreasing the possibility that differences in brain chemistry occurred due to 
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own condition, and thus renders them unaware of their illness.99 When patients 
have poor insight because of anosognosia, they have deficits in their ability to 
understand and appreciate their illness.100 Roughly fifty percent of people with 
schizophrenia suffer from anosognosia.101 Anosognosia is not specific to 
schizophrenia; the symptom also manifests in Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, 
and other diseases caused by lesions in the right hemisphere of the brain, such 
as traumatic brain injuries.102 Unlike denial, damage to the brain causes people 
with schizophrenia to develop anosognosia.103 Most studies have determined 
that anosognosia is linked to disease-based damage in the brain, disproving 
any suggestion that people with anosognosia are merely denying their ill-
ness.104 In fact, in 2000, the American Psychiatric Association updated the 
DSM to reflect new findings showing that poor insight is a symptom of schiz-
ophrenia, not a patient strategy to cope with an individual’s condition.105 
                                                                                                                           
medication rather than the disease. Id. The goal of this Note is not to debate whether anosognosia is or 
is not a legitimate symptom, however, it will at some points reference differing opinions regarding the 
extent to which anosognosia can be considered scientifically present, as the debate is pertinent to a 
new approach to informed consent for this patient population. See infra notes 217–229 and accompa-
nying text (summarizing scholars’ critiques of anosognosia as a symptom of schizophrenia, and not 
mere denial). 
 99 TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., supra note 98, at 1. The term anosognosia stems from two Greek 
words: “nosos,” meaning disease, and “gnosis,” meaning knowledge. Bennion, supra note 95, at 291. 
Taken together, the phrase translates as “to not know a disease.” Id. Initially, anosognosia had a nar-
row definition. Douglas S. Lehrer & Jennifer Lorenz, Anosognosia in Schizophrenia: Hidden in Plain 
Sight, INNOVATIONS IN CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE, May–June 2014, at 10, 12–13. Joseph Babinski, a 
French neurologist in the early 1900s, crafted the term and used it only in narrow circumstances for 
specific brain injuries. Id. Today, anosognosia has a broader application, stretching to any “neurologi-
cally based denial of illness and unawareness of disability.” Id. at 13. 
 100 Nicholas Kontos et al., “Poor Insight”: A Capacity Perspective on Treatment Refusal in Seri-
ous Mental Illness, 67 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1254, 1255 (2016). 
 101 See TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., supra note 98, at 1. The symptom manifests in approximately 
40% of people living with bipolar disorder, another type of serious mental illness. Id. 
 102 See Bennion, supra note 95, at 292; see also TORREY, supra note 44, at 48 (explaining that 
decreased insight is found in other brain disorders, such as Alzheimer’s disease); Philip Gerretsen et 
al., Frontotemporoparietal Asymmetry and Lack of Illness Awareness in Schizophrenia, 34 HUM. 
BRAIN MAPPING 1035, 1035 (2013) (describing other conditions that may have anosognosia as a 
symptom). 
 103 Bennion, supra note 95, at 292; see also Xavier F. Amador & Andrew A. Shiva, Insight into 
Schizophrenia: Anosognosia, Competency, and Civil Liberties, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 25, 25 
(2000) (explaining that poor insight in people with schizophrenia usually is due to problems in the 
brain, not denial). To determine whether a patient is in denial or instead suffering from anosognosia, 
three factors should be considered: (1) whether the lack of insight has lasted over a period of months 
or years, (2) whether the lack of insight is “fixed,” meaning it does not change even if presented with 
evidence, and (3) whether the person offers absurd explanations to persuade others that they do not 
have an illness. AMADOR, supra note 1, at 49. 
 104 Amador & Shiva, supra note 103, at 30. 
 105 Bennion, supra note 95, at 296 (quoting DSM-IV 304). The DSM provides doctors with a 
guide for diagnosing various mental illnesses. DSM-5: Frequently Asked Questions, AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/feedback-and-questions/frequently-
asked-questions [https://perma.cc/Q24L-V6H4]. The DSM includes “descriptions, symptoms, and 
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The severity of a patient’s anosognosia may vary.106 Some patients lack 
all knowledge of their illness, but others may be aware of some of the illness’s 
symptoms.107 Patients’ anosognosia may worsen if the symptoms of their dis-
ease go untreated.108 Patients who take medication may regain insight, suggest-
ing individuals with anosognosia may require medical intervention to improve 
their likelihood of recovery from their lack of insight.109 
The consequences of anosognosia for people with schizophrenia can be 
significant.110 Studies link anosognosia to decreased adherence to medication 
protocols, increased relapse rates, higher numbers of involuntary admissions to 
hospitals, and worsened brain functioning.111 Failing to take medication may 
be problematic, as new research suggests medications may stay the progression 
of schizophrenia or significantly reduce the disease’s symptoms.112 
Although medication may be the best option for a patient with schizo-
phrenia and anosognosia, prior to administering medication, the doctor must 
explain the pros and cons of accepting the treatment and ask for the patient’s 
informed consent.113 After hearing the doctor’s opinion, individuals generally 
have the right to refuse treatment.114 If a judge finds a patient incompetent, 
however, which may be at issue for patients with schizophrenia, he or she does 
not maintain that right.115 The following Section explains the doctrine of in-
formed consent and four theories of competency.116 
                                                                                                                           
other criteria for diagnosing mental disorders.” Id. Experts review the DSM periodically to ensure that 
it reflects modern science. Id. 
 106 Lehrer & Lorenz, supra note 99, at 15. 
 107 Amador & Shiva, supra note 103, at 27. Anosognosia may leave a person’s belief about that 
person’s self “stranded in time.” AMADOR, supra note 1, at 38. A person may “believe they have all 
the same abilities and the same prospects they enjoyed prior to the onset of their illnesses.” Id. 
 108 Epright, supra note 4, at 803. 
 109 See id. (referencing research that indicates patients may be able to obtain insight into their 
condition with medication). 
 110 Bennion, supra note 95, at 296 (quoting DSM-IV 304). 
 111 Id. 
 112 See Mossman, supra note 40, at 1048 n.71 (explaining that modern science demonstrates the 
ability of antipsychotic drugs to “quell” schizophrenia’s symptoms); see also Bennion, supra note 95, 
at 284 (describing new research suggesting that when patients do not accept treatment, their brains 
may lose more brain matter, suggesting that “early [treatment] intervention is to prevent this loss from 
occurring”). 
 113 W.M. Moldoff, Annotation, Malpractice: Physician’s Duty to Inform Patient of Nature and 
Hazards of Disease or Treatment, 79 A.L.R. 2d 1028, § 1 (1961) (explaining that a physician must 
disclose any material risks to the patient prior to administering treatment). 
 114 PEGALIS, supra note 12, § 4:1. 
 115 See infra notes 132–136 and accompanying text (explaining what occurs when a patient is 
determined incompetent). 
 116 See infra Part I.C. 
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C. Informed Consent & Patient Competency Determinations 
In general, physicians must provide patients with the information neces-
sary to make an educated decision regarding their treatment.117 Physicians 
must act for their patients’ interests alone.118 There are two primary standards 
for disclosure: one requires disclosure of risks a “reasonable medical practi-
tioner” would give a patient and the other requires the physician to disclose 
risks that a reasonable, prudent patient would want to know before consenting 
to treatment.119 After a physician discloses the risks of the medical procedure 
or treatment, it is up to their patients to determine whether they would like to 
accept the doctor’s suggestion.120 
Informed consent is rooted in the essential assumption of the Anglo-
American legal tradition that all individuals have the right to make their own 
choices.121 Often referred to as the “right to refuse treatment” in the medical 
context, the right has evolved through four different sources: federal and state 
constitutions, state statutes, and the common law.122 When individuals are con-
sidered competent to make decisions, a doctor cannot ignore their choices—
even if the doctor thinks it is unwise.123 Patients’ autonomous decisions are 
based upon their personal virtues, and doctors must respect them.124 There are 
exceptions to the general requirement of disclosure, such as emergency situa-
                                                                                                                           
 117 Moldoff, supra note 113, § 1. 
 118 See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 916 (1994) (describ-
ing the physician’s obligation to act on behalf of the patient’s interests, not the doctor’s preferences). 
 119 Id. There are, broadly, two different theories of how much information physicians are required 
to disclose to their patients. Id. at 903. “Idealists” argue that physicians should inform their patients 
about every minutia of the treatment, finding few pieces of information immaterial to a patient deci-
sion. Id. Typically, judges and medical theorists fall into the idealist camp. Id. In contrast, “realists,” a 
group largely comprised of medical practitioners, suggest that the additional patient anxiety and billed 
time occurring with extensive disclosures cuts against the core of informed consent. Id. at 904. “Real-
ists” focus on the material risks. Id. 
 120 Moldoff, supra note 113, § 1. 
 121 Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960) (“Anglo-American law starts with the 
premise of thorough-going self determination.”); see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (reiterating that patients’ right to choose their treatment is the “root premise . . . fun-
damental in American jurisprudence”); ROBERT F. SCHOPP, COMPETENCE, CONDEMNATION AND 
COMMITMENT: AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW 64 (2001) (describing autonomy 
as a “core value” considered in modern health care decision). 
 122 Kevin R. Wolff, Note, Determining Patient Competency in Treatment Refusal Cases, 24 GA. 
L. REV. 733, 737–38 (1990). The first state case focused on the right to refuse treatment was In re 
Quinlan, in 1976, in which the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that the right to privacy under 
the Fourteenth Amendment was “broad enough” to encompass a patient’s right to refuse lifesaving 
treatment. 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976); see also Wolff, supra, at 737–38 (describing the findings of 
the court in In re Quinlan). 
 123 Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1104. Even when doctors, using their medical judgment, believe that a 
treatment is necessary, patients have the right to choose. See id. 
 124 SCHOPP, supra note 121, at 65. A patient’s virtues may include “self-reflection, direction, 
reliance, and control; moral authenticity and independence; and responsibility for self.” Id. 
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tions or, most importantly for this Note, when a judge finds a patient legally 
incompetent to consent to treatment.125 
The law generally considers adults competent to make their own treat-
ment decisions under the law.126 When a question of a patient’s legal compe-
tency arises, a physician must assess the medical capabilities of the patient to 
make decisions.127 In the medical profession, this assessment is often referred 
to as determining a patient’s capacity, a different test than legal competency.128 
Although various capacity tests exist in the medical profession, each test re-
quires a careful consideration of the patient’s autonomy and other interests at 
stake.129 A doctor usually bases the capacity determination on the patient’s 
ability to do the following: understand the situation, communicate a choice to 
the physician, appreciate the potential outcomes of an illness, reason or ration-
alize generally, and consider the pros and cons of treatment.130 
                                                                                                                           
 125 See Schuck, supra note 118, at 919 (explaining the variety of situations in which informed 
consent to treatment is not required). Other examples of exceptions to informed consent include when 
disclosure would negatively impact a patient’s well-being, when there are blatantly obvious risks, 
when a treatment is so basic that danger is considered “remote,” and when it is reasonable for the 
doctor to be unaware of the risk. Id. 
 126 PEGALIS, supra note 12, § 4:1. “Competency” is a legal term referring to the “mental ability to 
understand problems and make decisions.” Competency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10; 
see also Wolff, supra note 122, at 743 (describing the legal definition of competency). There are 
many different types of competency in the U.S. legal tradition; the focus of this Note is the competen-
cy of a patient to refuse treatment. See supra notes 122–125 and accompanying text; infra notes 126–
130 (summarizing medical competency, at issue in this Note); see also Wolff, supra note 122, at 743 
(explaining that there are many different types of competency and stating that each type has its own 
test). Finding an individual competent to stand trial, for example, requires a different legal test than a 
determination of whether an individual is competent to make independent medical decisions. Id. The 
presumption of competency to refuse treatment extends to patients with mental illness. In re Qawi, 81 
P.3d 224, 233 (Cal. 2004). For patients with mental illness, the presumption rests on the premise that 
mental illness does not necessarily affect every aspect of the individual’s brain. See id. Even with a 
mental illness, an individual may still have the capacity to understand treatments, illness, and health. 
Id. Thus, the court should also presume an individual with mental illness is competent, unless a judge 
finds that such individual cannot meet the legal requirements of competency. See id. 
 127 Wolff, supra note 122, at 743–44. Importantly, the doctor’s determination of capacity is dif-
ferent than the legal determination of competency. Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing Compe-
tence: Formulating Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 
345, 348–49 (1996). Typically, only a judge can find someone legally incompetent. Id. at 348. Doc-
tors, in contrast, complete medical capacity determinations. Id. at 348–49. When a state legislature 
creates its competency standard, it weighs the severity of medical incapacity required for a finding of 
legal incompetence. Id. at 349. 
 128 Wolff, supra note 122, at 744; see also Berg et al., supra note 127, at 348–49 (explaining the 
difference between a doctor’s determination of medical capacity and a legal determination of compe-
tency). 
 129 Wolff, supra note 122, at 744. 
 130 See Joyeeta G. Dastidar & Andy Odden, How Do I Determine if My Patient Has Decision-
Making Capacity?, THE HOSPITALIST (Aug. 2011), https://www.the-hospitalist.org/hospitalist/article/
124731/how-do-i-determine-if-my-patient-has-decision-making-capacity [https://perma.cc/QK88-
KJFF] (explaining considerations doctors must take into account when determining whether a patient 
has the capacity to make treatment decisions). Doctors may employ clinical tools to determine capaci-
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When patients dispute a physician’s determination of medical capacity, a 
judge must make a legal competency determination; there is, however, no gen-
eral consensus among approaches to competency determinations.131 If an indi-
vidual is found incompetent, such individual will not be able to make treatment 
decisions directly.132 After a judge finds a patient incompetent, a patient’s rep-
resentative, acting as a surrogate, will make decisions on behalf of the pa-
tient.133 There are two standards of surrogate decision making.134 The “best 
interests” standard aims to make decisions that promote the patient’s best in-
terests.135 The “substituted judgment” standard, in contrast, requires the surro-
gate to stand in the shoes of the patient and make the choice the surrogate be-
lieves the patient would make if they were competent.136 
                                                                                                                           
ty, such as the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tools for Treatment. Id. These tools allow doctors 
to assign scores for the capacity factors. Id. When a doctor determines that an individual is incompe-
tent, the individual then lacks the ability to make autonomous decisions. SCHOPP, supra note 121, at 
66. Arguably, certain mental illnesses may cause a patient to lack the ability to make rational, auton-
omous decisions due to the illness’s impact upon the patient’s thinking abilities. Id. 
 131 Berg et al., supra note 127, at 348–49. 
 132 See Kathleen Knepper, The Importance of Establishing Competence in Cases Involving the 
Involuntary Administration of Psychotropic Medications, 20 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 97, 104–05 (1996) 
(explaining the process following a patient’s classification as incompetent). 
 133 See id. (describing how an incompetent patient’s treatment decisions are made). 
 134 See id. (providing an overview of the two different standards used when a surrogate makes 
decisions for a patient). 
 135 Id. at 105. When a court is faced with an adult who has never been competent or a case involv-
ing a child, it will usually apply the “best interests” standard of surrogate decision making. See id. 
Adults who have never had competency and children are similar. Id. Neither group has ever been 
competent under the law. Id. Therefore, surrogate decision making would be ineffective for these 
individuals because neither group has ever been in the position to describe what they would want 
while competent to choose. Id. 
 136 Id. at 105–06. When a court considers the competency of an adult who is currently incompe-
tent but, in the past, was competent, it typically applies the “substituted judgment” standard. Id. The 
“substituted judgment” standard is rooted in the English common law. Peter Skinner, Tipping the 
Scales: How Guardianship of Brandon Has Upset Massachusetts’ Balanced Substituted Judgment 
Doctrine, 40 B.C. L. REV. 969, 970 (1999). At common law, there were two types of individuals with 
mental illnesses: the “lunatic” and the “idiot.” Id. at 970–71. The “idiot” was never competent and had 
no ability to regain competency. Id. The “lunatic,” however, was not born incompetent and could 
regain competency, which warranted different treatment under the law. Id. at 971. In England, the 
King controlled the “idiot’s” property until that person’s time of death, and could take any profits 
flowing from the property. Id. The King could not, by contrast, take the profits of the “lunatic’s” land 
because that person could recover competency at any moment. Id. Thus, the “lunatic” is analogous to 
the formerly competent patient, which warrants the use of the “substituted judgement” standard. See 
id. The “substituted judgment” standard applies in this context because the individual has had the 
opportunity, while competent, to describe treatment preferences. Knepper, supra note 132, at 105. In 
these cases, the surrogate should be a person that is familiar with the patient and will effectuate the 
patient’s judgment. Id. at 106. 
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There are at least four prominent legal competency theories, identified by 
experts and most competency statutes integrate one or more of these theories.137 
The following subsections will briefly address each of these theories in turn.138 
1. The Patient Can Make a Choice 
The first theory, the mere “ability to communicate a choice,” requires the 
least rigorous review of the patient’s capabilities.139 Under this theory, when a 
patient can communicate a decision, the patient is deemed competent.140 Even 
if a patient’s basis for the decision is thought to be untenable, a judge applying 
this standard must consider the patient competent because of the patient’s abil-
ity to make any choice at all.141 Essentially, only patients in comas or vegeta-
tive states are deemed incompetent under this theory.142 This theory of compe-
tency protects a patient’s autonomy more than any other standard.143 Further-
more, it may also be considered the most dependable theory, subject to the 
least amount of interpretation.144 All a trier of fact must consider is whether the 
individual communicated some choice.145 
The ability to communicate a choice, however, has never in and of itself 
been sufficient to establish competency; courts and state legislatures have not 
                                                                                                                           
 137 Berg et al., supra note 127, at 347 (explaining that competency standards across the United 
States vary significantly and there is a need for an “authoritative framework” for competency); Wolff, 
supra note 122, at 744–49 (describing five different doctrines of competency). Scholars have identi-
fied these four, over-arching theories in their extensive review of competency law. Berg et al., supra 
note 127, at 351. These experts conducted a review of legal competency statutes, and identified four 
clear components of statutes: (1) the patient can make a choice; (2) the patient can understand, but not 
appreciate, the information; (3) the patient can understand and appreciate the information; and (4) the 
patient understands, appreciates, and makes a rational decision. Id.; see also BRUCE J. WINICK, THE 
RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 349 (1997) (describing the four common theories of 
competency and their origin). For example, the Idaho competency statute requires a court to find that 
an individual can “achieve a rudimentary understanding of the purpose, nature, and possible risks and 
benefits of a decision, after conscientious efforts at explanation” to be competent. IDAHO CODE § 66-
402(9) (2020). In Alaska, however, a court must consider whether a person can make rational deci-
sions about their treatment to be competent. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(1) (2020). Both of these 
statutes incorporate some (or all) of the theories listed above. See id. (listing the requirements for 
competency in Alaska); IDAHO CODE § 66-402(9) (defining the competency standard in Idaho); see 
also Berg et al., supra note 127, at 351 (providing an overview of the different components of legal 
competency statutes).  
 138 See infra notes 139–164 and accompanying text (describing the four theories of competency). 
 139 See Berg et al., supra note 127, at 352 (explaining the “least stringent” approach to competen-
cy, the “[a]bility to [c]ommunicate a [c]hoice”). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 353. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. Scholars may consider this standard the “least paternalistic” because nothing more than a 
patient’s choice is required. Wolff, supra note 122, at 744–45. There is no room for interpretation. Id. 
 144 Wolff, supra note 122, at 744–45. 
 145 Id. 
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used the theory of choice alone to determine competency.146 Instead, commu-
nication of a choice is typically one component of a competency theory that 
also encompasses other elements, such as the ability to understand the infor-
mation presented.147 
2. The Patient Can Understand—But Cannot Appreciate—the Information 
A second theory—the one most often used in the United States—tests 
whether a patient can understand the information presented.148 This is a slightly 
higher standard than the ability to communicate a choice.149 In jurisdictions that 
use this theory, courts require an individual to “comprehend the concepts in-
volved” but the patient need not fully appreciate the situation.150 Thus, a patient 
would solely need to understand what a disease or symptom is, but not appreci-
ate that the symptom or disease is applicable to the patient him or herself.151 
For example, Idaho adopts the “understanding” theory of competency.152 
Idaho’s statute requires doctors to find patients incompetent if they have the 
“inability . . . to achieve a rudimentary understanding of the purpose, nature, 
and possible risks and benefits of a decision.”153 
3. The Patient Can Understand and Appreciate the Information 
A third theory, which tests the patient even more stringently than the two 
theories described above, requires the patient to both understand the infor-
mation presented and understand that the information presented is applicable 
                                                                                                                           
 146 Berg et al., supra note 127, at 353. 
 147 Id. For example, in 1986, in In re O’Brien, the Supreme Court of New York County, New 
York, considered a patient’s competency. See 517 N.Y.S.2d 346, 346 (Sup. Ct. 1986). A patient on 
life support was able to communicate by squeezing the hand of another person, and sometimes shak-
ing his head yes or no. Id. at 347. Although the patient was able to answer some questions, the court 
determined that the seriousness of the patient’s refusal of life-saving treatment could not be decided 
on the basis of a nod. Id. at 348. The court did not want to rely on a gesture that could be mere annoy-
ance to determine whether the patient was able to make a choice. Id. Thus, the court determined that 
the patient was incompetent to make decisions regarding the removal of life-saving treatment. Id. 
 148 See Berg et al., supra note 127, at 353 (describing a theory that requires the patient to merely 
understand the information presented to be deemed competent). 
 149 See id. (describing the second theory of competency tests). This theory, generally recognized 
by legal theorists, seems on par with the “pure understanding” view, which “deems a person compe-
tent if he can assimilate the information that the caregiver provides.” See Saks, Competency to Refuse 
Treatment, supra note 14, at 952. Like the “ability to understand,” the “pure understanding” view 
merely requires the patient to comprehend the information offered by the doctor but not necessarily 
accept it as true. See id. 
 150 Berg et al., supra note 127, at 353–54. 
 151 Id. 
 152 IDAHO CODE § 66-402(9) (2020). The Idaho statute requires the patient to “achieve a rudimen-
tary understanding of the purpose, nature, and possible risks and benefits of a decision, after conscien-
tious efforts at explanation” to be competent. Id. 
 153 Id. 
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to the patient.154 If a jurisdiction uses this theory, the patient must understand 
the information and appreciate the fact that the information applies to the pa-
tient and may carry certain consequences for the patient.155 
Statutes that require an individual to “understand and appreciate” may 
vary.156 For example, in Alaska, the relevant statute explicitly requires patients to 
appreciate that they have an impairment to be deemed competent.157 In contrast, 
in Tennessee, the statute merely requires that patients are “able to understand and 
appreciate the nature and consequences” of their treatment decisions.158 
4. The Patient Understands, Appreciates, and Makes a Rational Decision 
Finally, some theories of competency require that a patient fulfills the re-
quirements of the aforementioned third theory and makes a rational decision 
about treatment.159 This approach examines whether the patient is capable of 
                                                                                                                           
 154 See Berg et al., supra note 127, at 355–57 (describing this view of competency). One promi-
nent theorist refers to this as the “understanding and belief” theory of competency, which requires that 
the patient both comprehend the information offered by the provider and also believe that the infor-
mation is true. See Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, supra note 14, at 955. In practice, when a 
jurisdiction uses the “understanding and belief” theory, it requires the patient’s beliefs about the doc-
tor’s statements to be completely irrational for a finding of incompetence. See id. at 956. This Note 
will further explore the impact these different standards have upon people with schizophrenia, and 
more specifically, those with the symptom of anosognosia, in Part II. See infra notes 202–263 and 
accompanying text. In 1978, in Lane v. Candura, the Massachusetts Appeals Court granted a finding 
of competence when a woman refused to amputate her gangrened leg. See 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1233 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1978). Although the court referred to her refusal as irrational, it determined that her 
acts were “not the uninformed decision of a person incapable of appreciating the nature and conse-
quences of her act.” Id. at 1236. Thus, the patient could refuse amputation, even though her view of 
the situation was arguably irrational. Id. 
 155 Berg et al., supra note 127, at 356–57. If a statute does not explicitly state “understand and 
appreciate” and solely requires the individual to “appreciate,” “understanding” is typically read into 
the statute. Id. at 355 n.29. 
 156 Compare ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(1) (2020) (explicitly requiring the patient to appreciate 
that he or she has an impairment), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(1) (2020) (stating that a com-
petent person is one who “is able to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of a deci-
sion to accept or refuse treatment”). 
 157 ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(1). The Alaska statute has an additional component that requires 
the patient to make rational decisions; for a robust discussion of the statute see infra notes 159–164 
and accompanying text. 
 158 TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(1); see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.002(5) 
(West 2019) (requiring the patient to “understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of a 
treatment decision, including the significant benefits and harms of and reasonable alternatives to any 
proposed treatment decisions” to be competent). 
 159 See Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, supra note 14, at 956–57 (describing the “full 
reasoning” approach to competency); see also Berg et al., supra note 127, at 357–58 (explaining the 
competency approach that requires patients to be able to “manipulate information rationally”). When a 
competency statute or standard includes this type of rationality requirement, the focus of the standard 
is upon the patient’s thought-process, not so much on the patient’s final decision about the treatment. 
Berg et al., supra note 127, at 357. When this type of test is at issue, “a patient who can understand, 
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logically making a decision about treatment by considering all of the infor-
mation offered and weighing the pros and cons of the proposed treatment.160 
For example, in Alabama, individuals are considered incompetent when they 
become impaired “to the extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity 
to make or communicate responsible decisions.”161 A court may struggle to 
apply this type of competency statute, as it requires the adjudicator to apply its 
own standards of what comprises a “rational” decision.162 
Although competent patients with schizophrenia retain the right to refuse 
medication, they may still be subject to involuntary commitment.163 The fol-
lowing Section explains the difference between the legal standard for incompe-
tency and the legal standard for involuntary commitment, and also describes 
the treatment options currently available to patients with schizophrenia.164 
D. Treating Schizophrenia & Severe Mental Illness:  
Involuntary and Voluntary Methods 
From the 1940s to 1970s, when state facilities were the norm for treating 
people with mental illness, the only legal requirement for involuntary treat-
ment, including involuntary antipsychotic medication or other invasive treat-
ments, was a judicial review of a doctor’s determination that a patient had a 
mental illness and that the patient required treatment.165 At that time, patients 
could be given antipsychotic medications involuntarily because the standard 
for involuntary treatment was identical to that for involuntary commitment.166 
This lenient standard lead to the institutionalization of more than 500,000 peo-
ple with mental illness by the mid-1950s.167 
                                                                                                                           
appreciate and communicate a decision may still be impaired because she is unable to process infor-
mation logically.” Id. 
 160 Berg et al., supra note 127, at 357–58. 
 161 ALA. CODE § 26-2A-20(8) (2020); see also Berg et al., supra note 127, at 360 (referring to 
state statutes utilizing the rational decision-making standard). Alaska’s statute contains a rational 
decision-making element, which requires the patient to “assimilate relevant facts” and “participate in 
treatment decisions by means of a rational thought process.” ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(1). 
 162 Berg et al., supra note 127, at 358 (explaining the rational decision-making approach to com-
petency and briefly discussing how a judge should apply the standard). 
 163 See infra notes 186–190 and accompanying text (describing the differences between the invol-
untary commitment standard and incompetency standard). 
 164 See infra Part I.D. 
 165 Richard C. Boldt, Perspectives on Outpatient Commitment, 49 NEW ENG. L. REV. 39, 42 
(2014). At this time, there was a presumption that people with mental illness should be institutional-
ized, and this presumption was essentially impossible to rebut. Id. at 44. 
 166 See Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to “Just Say No”: A History and Analysis of the Right to 
Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 315 (1992) (explaining that historically individuals 
with mental illness in institutions were not subject to informed consent doctrine). 
 167 Boldt, supra note 165, at 42. 
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There were two primary reasons courts at this time did not grant these pa-
tients the right to refuse medication once institutionalized.168 First, some courts 
did not want to extend tort liability to doctors at institutions.169 Second, there 
was a nearly universal belief that individuals in institutions were per se incompe-
tent to make any decisions regarding treatment, including the administration of 
antipsychotic medications or other intrusive therapies.170 For example, in 1976, 
in Price v. Sheppard, the Supreme Court of Minnesota considered whether an 
involuntarily institutionalized patient could receive electroshock therapy against 
his will.171 The court determined that after the state met its burden for institu-
tionalizing an individual, it had the right to make decisions about the person’s 
                                                                                                                           
 168 Cichon, supra note 166, at 315. 
 169 Id.; see also Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1383 (D. Mass. 1979) (holding that tort liabil-
ity does not apply to doctors treating patients with mental illness that have been involuntarily institu-
tionalized), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom. Mills v. 
Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) (holding that new Massachusetts laws required reconsideration of 
whether a patient, held involuntarily in a psychiatric institution, could refuse antipsychotic medica-
tion). In 1979, in Rogers v. Okin, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that individ-
uals in institutions could not recover damages against doctors who treated them with antipsychotic 
medications against their will. Id. at 1383–84. The plaintiffs contended that the unwanted touching 
and restraining required to administer the treatment sufficiently met the elements of battery. Id. The 
court, however, decided that the intentional tort could not apply to the activities occurring within a 
state mental institution. Id. at 1384. The court determined that once patients are in an institution for 
treatment of a psychiatric disorder, they have consented to all touching or force that is “reasonably 
necessary” for their treatment. Id. Battery could not apply because it requires non-consensual touch-
ing. Id. The theory of consent to all “reasonably necessary” touching applies whether patients are in 
the institution voluntarily or involuntarily. Id. Rather than a theory of intentional tort, the court deter-
mined that malpractice would be more appropriate. Id. Thus, the plaintiffs would need to show that 
the defendant’s conduct was not within the standards of reasonable medical practice in a psychiatric 
institution to succeed on their claims. Id. 
 170 Cichon, supra note 166, at 315. 
 171 See 239 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Minn. 1976) (holding that the administration of twenty electro-
shock treatments against the will of a patient held involuntarily at a state hospital did not violate the 
plaintiff’s rights). Electroshock therapy, known today as electroconvulsive therapy, aims to alter an 
individual’s brain chemistry and may lessen the symptoms of some mental illnesses. Electroconvul-
sive Therapy (ECT), MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/electroconvulsive-
therapy/about/pac-20393894 [https://perma.cc/H972-SCX7]. It can be used as a treatment for severe 
or treatment-resistant depression, mania, and some symptoms of schizophrenia and dementia. Id. 
Early electroconvulsive therapies were dangerous and the therapy was also used to “control difficult 
patients and to maintain order on wards,” rather than to help patients. Jonathan Sadowsky, Electro-
convulsive Therapy: A History of Controversy, but Also of Help, SCI. AM. (Jan. 13, 2017), https://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/electroconvulsive-therapy-a-history-of-controversy-but-also-of-
help/ [https://perma.cc/F876-H9RM]. Today, doctors administer anesthesia to avoid seizures and 
physical pain. Id. 
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treatment.172 If the state found that a treatment was in the best interest of the pa-
tient, it could impose the treatment.173 
In the 1960s, as the trend toward deinstitutionalization expanded, promi-
nent legal decisions and journal publications exposed the atrocities occurring at 
institutions for people with mental illness, which led to a change in the standard 
for institutionalization.174 The new involuntary commitment standard required a 
judicial determination, proven by the state with clear and convincing evidence, 
that an individual (1) had a mental illness and (2) was a danger to himself, her-
self, or others.175 This new standard is often referred to as the “dangerousness 
standard.”176 It reflected a general trend towards a presumption of competence 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See Price, 239 N.W.2d at 911. The court underscored that commitment requires a showing 
that the individual is mentally ill and thus cannot make decisions regarding treatment. See id. The 
court reasoned that if an individual is committed, such individual clearly cannot make any decision 
about treatment, including whether to take medication. See id. 
 173 See id. (explaining that once a patient is held in a facility, the state can make virtually any 
decisions on the patient’s behalf). 
 174 See Boldt, supra note 165, at 42–43 (explaining the change in the involuntary treatment stand-
ard). 
 175 See id. at 43–45. Two important cases led the charge in revising the standard for involuntary 
commitment. Id. In 1972, in Lessard v. Schmidt, the District Court for the Eastern District of Wiscon-
sin considered whether an involuntary commitment statute was constitutional. See 349 F. Supp. 1078, 
1082 (E.D. Wis. 1972). The plaintiffs, a class of people on involuntary holds in Wisconsin, argued 
that the statute was unconstitutional because it did not require the state to show that “society has a 
compelling interest” in depriving them of their liberty. Id. at 1084. The court determined that involun-
tary commitment was warranted when “the proper burden of proof is satisfied and dangerousness is 
based upon a finding of a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to oneself or anoth-
er.” Id. at 1093. The court drew a comparison between mental and physical illness, suggesting that 
people with physical ailments are “allowed the choice of whether to undergo hospitalization and 
treatment or not,” and determined that people with mental illness should also have the same oppor-
tunity for choice. Id. at 1094. 
 In 1979, in Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court considered the appropriate standard of evi-
dence for civil commitment. See 441 U.S. 418, 419–20 (1979); see also Boldt, supra note 165, at 43 
(describing the landmark decisions leading to a change in the standard for involuntary civil commit-
ment). In Addington, the Supreme Court determined that states have a “legitimate interest under [their] 
parens patriae powers in providing care to [their] citizens who are unable because of emotional disor-
ders to care for themselves.” 441 U.S. at 426. The Court noted, however, that this interest is limited, 
and most states require a showing that the patient is a danger to self or others. Id. In addressing the 
standard of evidence required for civil commitment, the Court noted that a standard of beyond a rea-
sonable doubt is untenable for determining psychiatric conditions. Id. at 430. Certainty is difficult to 
establish for psychiatric diagnoses because of the “subtleties and nuances” involved in diagnosing 
these diseases. Id. In addition, the Court found that the burden of a preponderance of the evidence 
failed the appropriate level of due process, and landed upon a standard of at least “clear and convinc-
ing” evidence. Id. at 432–33. 
 176 SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 3, at 3. The “dangerous-
ness standard” refers to the requirement that a patient must present as a danger to self or others to be 
subject to involuntary commitment. See id. at 4. The goal of commitment based on dangerousness is 
to protect the public, not necessarily the patient. See id. Instead of imposing the dangerousness stand-
ard, some states find that involuntary treatment may be warranted when an individual has a “grave 
disability” or is likely to endure “serious deterioration” as a result of a mental illness. Id. at 9–10. 
These statutes, however, may still include a dangerousness component. Id. at 9. An individual may 
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for all individuals to refuse or accept treatment.177 The old standard—a mere 
showing of a need for treatment—was alleged to be too paternalistic.178 
The new standard represented a shift in application of a state’s parens pa-
triae power.179 Parens patriae refers to a state’s power to intervene when indi-
viduals do not have the capacity to care for themselves.180 The states saw these 
early standards, requiring a showing of a mere need for treatment, as part of 
the state’s parens patriae power to help those with mental illness who other-
wise may not have received aid.181 The dangerousness standard, however, rep-
resented a shift in how states viewed people with mental illness.182 Rather than 
                                                                                                                           
have a “grave disability” when such individual cannot obtain basic necessities, such as food, a place to 
live, water, and clothing. See id. There is some confusion regarding the state’s ability to subject an 
individual to involuntary commitment without a showing of dangerousness. See id. at 10. In 1975, in 
O’Connor v. Donaldson, the Supreme Court considered the case of Kenneth Donaldson, a patient with 
mental illness who was held in a facility for nearly fifteen years. See 422 U.S. 563, 564–65 (1975). 
There was no evidence that Donaldson was a danger to himself or others, and the basis of his con-
finement at the hospital was “care, maintenance, and treatment” under a Florida commitment statute. 
Id. at 565–66. The Court did not explicitly state that dangerousness was required for civil commit-
ment, but determined that a state “cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous indi-
vidual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and re-
sponsible family members or friends.” Id. at 576. Earlier in the opinion, however, the Court indicated 
that dangerousness is required for civil commitment. Id. at 575 (“[T]here is still no constitutional basis 
for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in free-
dom.”). Some argue that this statement from the Supreme Court indicates that dangerousness is re-
quired for civil commitment, however, the Court has not explicitly weighed in on the issue. See SUB-
STANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 3, at 10–11 (suggesting that the Su-
preme Court’s decision in O’Connor may not explicitly require dangerousness as an element of the 
involuntary commitment statute). Although these standards at first blush may seem more lenient than 
the dangerousness standard, they may require a showing that a person is likely to become dangerous, 
which is a high bar. See id. at 9–11 (describing the “grave disability” and “serious deterioration” 
standard requirements). In some states, a finding of incompetency may be a factor for commitment, 
however, incompetency alone is insufficient for involuntary treatment today. Id. at 12. 
 177 See Boldt, supra note 165, at 42–43 (describing the new approach to competency). 
 178 See Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of 
the Mentally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54, 54–55 (1982) (explaining how involuntary commit-
ment is paternalistic). The prior involuntary commitment standard, a mere need for treatment, was 
often criticized for being too great an exercise of the state’s police power and for failing to require a 
substantial state interest before imposing civil commitment upon individuals. See id. (describing the 
problematic nature of old involuntary commitment standards and the shift to the new involuntary 
commitment statutes). 
 179 See Boldt, supra note 165, at 45 (describing a new application of a state’s parens patriae pow-
er). Parens patriae, in the medical context, may be applicable “when people are so disabled that they 
do not recognize their own need for treatment or cannot provide their own basic needs” due to their 
illness. TORREY, supra note 44, at 162. “Parens patriae” refers to the state’s role as the protector of 
those who do not have the ability to protect themselves. Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 10. 
 180 Parens Patriae, supra note 179. 
 181 See Boldt, supra note 165, at 45 (explaining a shift in the understanding of a state’s involun-
tary commitment power from parens patriae to the police power to protect the public from dangerous 
individuals). 
 182 Id. 
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seeing these individuals as having no autonomy and requiring the state’s help, 
the new standard only allows the state to intervene when there is a strong com-
peting interest, like safety, aligned with the state’s police power.183 Although 
the dangerousness standard better protects patient autonomy, critics allege the 
standard fails to focus on healing.184 Instead, the standard considers whether 
patients are likely to cause injury to themselves or others, placing treatment of 
the disease as a secondary consideration.185 
Today, meeting the requirements for involuntary commitment under the 
dangerousness standard does not necessarily mean a patient is incompetent to 
refuse treatment.186 The criteria for commitment is different than the criteria 
for incompetency.187 The dangerousness standard requires a showing that pa-
tients pose a harm to themselves or others.188 A finding of incompetency, on 
the other hand, considers patients’ abilities to understand the doctor’s proposed 
treatment, among other requirements.189 Thus, patients can be involuntarily 
committed based on dangerousness, but, if competent, may retain the right to 
refuse treatment.190 
States have recently adopted new programs, referred to as “assisted outpa-
tient treatment” or “involuntary outpatient treatment,” that offer court-
                                                                                                                           
 183 Id. 
 184 Kontos et al., supra note 100, at 1255. Critics suggest that there is a discrepancy between the 
treatment of individuals with mental illness and those suffering from physical ailments. Id. When a 
patient has a physical illness, the primary concern is healing the disease and ensuring the patient re-
ceives the best possible treatment. See id. For mental illness, in contrast, the focus shifts from healing 
the individual to protecting others from danger. Id. In the case of mental illness, hospitalizations may 
“resemble protective custody more than they do clinical care.” Id. In the case of “Mr. C,” an example 
patient described in one article, the difference in treatment between mental illness and physical illness 
is particularly profound. See id. at 1254. Mr. C was a homeless man living with schizophrenia. Id. Mr. 
C was brought to the emergency room against his will because he had a severe infection in his leg. Id. 
He refused amputation. Id. The doctors determined that he lacked the capacity to refuse treatment, 
successfully obtained a medical guardianship, and moved forward with the amputation against his 
will. Id. After Mr. C recovered from surgery, he was taken to a psychiatric facility. Id. The goal of his 
psychiatric treatment was solely to help facilitate his physical recovery from surgery, not his mental 
recovery from schizophrenia. Id. at 1255. Although, in this case, Mr. C did eventually receive treat-
ment for his schizophrenia, it was only due to his urgent physical condition that the state was willing 
to intervene. Id. 
 185 See id. at 1255 (explaining that there are significant differences in the hospitalization of indi-
viduals for physical illness and for mental illness). 
 186 See Cichon, supra note 166, at 348–49 (explaining the difference between a finding of incom-
petency and a finding of dangerousness that warrants commitment). 
 187 See id. (clarifying that a patient may be committed but still competent to refuse aspects of the 
treatment). 
 188 See Boldt, supra note 165, at 44–45 (describing the requirements for civil commitment). 
 189 See supra notes 117–155 and accompanying text (explaining the different requirements for a 
finding of competency). 
 190 See Cichon, supra note 166, at 349–50; see also Kontos et al., supra note 100, at 1255 (ex-
plaining that patients retain the ability to decline medication even when they are committed involun-
tarily). 
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mandated, involuntary treatment in the community, rather than in hospital-
based facilities.191 These programs apply to people with mental illness who 
meet specific statutory requirements, such as a history of hospitalizations or 
criminal activity.192 For example, in 1999, New York passed a law, colloquially 
referred to as “Kendra’s Law,” which allows involuntary outpatient treat-
ment.193 The law applies to those who, as determined by a doctor, need supervi-
sion to thrive in the community, have previously failed to comply with treat-
ments, will not accept voluntary treatment, and have acted violently or threat-
ened violence within the previous four years.194 Kendra’s Law is credited with 
reducing the arrests and violent acts of people with mental illness, lowering 
New York cost expenditures, lessening the volume of psychiatric hospitaliza-
                                                                                                                           
 191 Features and News, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/
fixing-the-system/features-and-news/3096-we-did-it-with-unanimous-support-hr-2646-passes-out-of-
committee [https://perma.cc/7N24-2BDH]. Assisted outpatient treatment may include several different 
elements. See In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 482 (N.Y. 2004). For example, in 2004, in In re K.L., the 
New York Court of Appeals described an assisted outpatient treatment order that required the patient 
to comply with case management, blood tests, therapy with psychiatrists, and medication. Id. 
 192 What Is AOT?, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/
documents/aot-one-pager.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ARS-VMJH]. 
 193 See Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Outpatient Commitment Law: Kendra’s 
Law and Case Study, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 183, 194–95 (2003) (explaining Kendra’s Law); 
see also NY MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (Consol. 2020). Kendra’s Law focuses on care coordination 
through case management. NY MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60. The care mandated may include different 
services, such as: Involuntary antipsychotic medication, tests to ensure the patient takes his or her 
medication, full-day or partial-day programs, therapy in individual or group settings, treatment for 
alcohol or substance abuse, drug or alcohol testing, mandated living arrangements, and more. See id. 
(describing the type of treatment that can be required under Kendra’s Law). 
 194 Perlin, supra note 193, at 194–95. Additionally, the person must be at least eighteen and living 
with mental illness for Kendra’s Law to apply. Id. Obtaining assisted outpatient treatment for an indi-
vidual under Kendra’s Law requires a petition by a person who cares for the individual, such as a 
parent, spouse, or treating physician. See id. at 195. Following the petition, a court will hold a hearing, 
during which a physician must testify to the fact that assisted outpatient treatment is the “least restric-
tive alternative available.” Id. If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the individual 
meets the requirements of the statute, the individual will be required to attend assisted outpatient 
treatment, which may include involuntary medication, for up to six months. Id. Kendra’s Law is 
named for Kendra Webdale, who died tragically at age 32 after being pushed into the path of a New 
York City subway train. Nicholas Tantillo, The Story Behind Kendra’s Law, WAMC NE. PUB. RADIO 
(May 21, 2017), https://www.wamc.org/post/story-behind-kendra-s-law [https://perma.cc/WE8T-
4KTA]. The person who pushed Kendra, Andrew Goldstein, was a 29-year-old man, living in Queens 
with a history of serious mental illness. Id. Although Goldstein had been subjected to in-patient hospi-
talization for his illness, he had not been forced to stay for long. Id. Kendra’s death led the New York 
Attorney General’s Office to take account of its legislation on the topic of mental illness to determine 
if any “gaps” existed. Id. After reviewing the available information, the attorney general’s office land-
ed upon assisted outpatient treatment, which led to the inception of Kendra’s Law. Id. Not all mem-
bers of the New York Assembly supported the law, as some felt that the law “stigmatizes people with 
mental health problems.” Id. To compromise with these members, Kendra’s Law requires a vote to 
extend the law every five years. Id. 
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tion, cutting down rates of homelessness for people with mental illness, and 
decreasing incarceration rates of people with mental illness.195 
In contrast to involuntary methods of treatment, when patients recognize 
their illness and accept treatment, they may voluntarily enter a facility of their 
choice, which may or may not include medication as part of the treatment 
plan.196 Those who have experienced both voluntary and involuntary treatment 
emphasize the benefits of voluntary treatment.197 It is heralded as the best option 
because patients are more likely to comply with treatment when they have ac-
cepted their illness and seek help from medical professionals.198 Patients with 
anosognosia, however, may be unlikely to enter treatment voluntarily because of 
their inability to recognize their illness.199 Not only does anosognosia potentially 
make it difficult for a patient to accept treatment, but it also can make a compe-
tency finding challenging.200 This Note’s next Part discusses three competing 
approaches to competency for patients with schizophrenia and anosognosia.201 
II. A MATTER OF OPINION: APPLYING COMPETENCY THEORIES TO 
INDIVIDUALS WITH SCHIZOPHRENIA & ANOSOGNOSIA 
Legal scholars disagree about the competency of individuals with schizo-
phrenia and symptoms of anosognosia.202 Some would find patients incompe-
                                                                                                                           
 195 What Is AOT?, supra note 192. According to the Treatment Advocacy Center, of people with 
mental illness, “77% fewer experienced psychiatric hospitalization, 74% fewer experienced homeless-
ness, 83% fewer experienced arrest, [and] 87% fewer experienced incarceration.” Id. 
 196 TORREY, supra note 44, at 162. 
 197 See, e.g., WANG, supra note 33, at 110. In her book of personal essays, Wang describes her 
experience living with schizophrenia, including her involuntary treatment at various hospitals. Id. 
Wang suggests that “there are inevitable parallels between involuntary hospitalization and incarcera-
tion.” Id. Although Wang acknowledges that involuntary commitment may sometimes be needed, 
personally “it has never felt useful to [her].” Id. at 108. 
 198 See WINICK, supra note 137, at 328 (explaining that when patients choose to seek treatment, 
they may have a more successful treatment outcome). Individuals that choose to seek treatment may 
feel more personally committed to getting well, and may be more likely to show up for their sched-
uled treatments because they chose their path forward. Id. at 329–30. 
 199 TORREY, supra note 44, at 162. 
 200 See infra Part II (summarizing courts’ disparate applications of competency tests to patients 
with anosognosia and the accompanying varied outcomes). 
 201 See infra Part II. 
 202 Compare Saks, Revisiting the Role of Denial of Mental Illness in Capacity Determinations, 
supra note 14, at 171 (explaining that denial of illness, without other symptoms or incorrect beliefs, is 
insufficient to warrant a finding of incompetency), with Epright, supra note 4, at 805 (explaining that 
when patients are unable to understand that they are sick, they cannot meet the requisite requirements 
for informed consent, rendering them incompetent). As one scholar noted, “competence, like beauty, 
lies very much in the eye of the beholder.” Judi Chamberlin, The Right to Be Wrong, in CHOICE & 
RESPONSIBILITY: LEGAL AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN SERVICES FOR PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISA-
BILITIES, supra note 52, at 45, 49. It is important to remember that states may have different types of 
competency statutes that apply different theories of competency; due to the inconsistencies among 
statutes, it is not always possible to make direct comparisons. Compare IDAHO Code § 66-402(9) 
(2020) (stating that an individual must “achieve a rudimentary understanding of the purpose, nature, 
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tent if they exhibit signs of anosognosia.203 Others would only find patients 
with anosognosia incompetent if they exhibit additional, obvious symptoms of 
the disease, like severe delusions or violence.204 Similarly, courts applying 
state competency standards inconsistently weigh anosognosia in their deci-
sions; some find that anosognosia warrants incompetency, while others do 
not.205 This Part explains three competing theories of competency as applied to 
individuals with anosognosia, and describes the benefits of each application.206 
Section A describes the theory that anosognosia is insufficient for a finding of 
incompetency.207 Section B outlines the idea that anosognosia, in concert with 
other symptoms, can be sufficient for a finding of incompetency.208 Section C 
summarizes the theory that anosognosia renders a patient incompetent.209 
A. A Patient with Anosognosia Is Competent 
In 1994, in In re Virgil D., the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that an 
individual with schizophrenia who was unable to recognize his illness was 
competent to refuse antipsychotic medication.210 There, the competency statute 
required a patient to comprehend the benefits and risks of a treatment and 
treatment alternatives to be competent to refuse a treatment.211 The Court of 
Appeals of Wisconsin had determined that the patient’s inability to understand 
                                                                                                                           
and possible risks and benefits of a decision, after conscientious efforts at explanation” to be compe-
tent), with ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(1) (2020) (requiring that an individual can make rational deci-
sions about treatment to be competent). This Part aims to demonstrate the different court applications 
of the standard when a patient has anosognosia and describe legal theorists’ views of anosognosia’s 
impact on competency. See infra notes 210–263 and accompanying text (analyzing three different 
approaches to competency as applied to individuals with schizophrenia and anosognosia). 
 203 See Epright, supra note 4, at 805 (suggesting that when patients do not have insight into their 
condition, they do not have the ability to exercise a choice). 
 204 See Saks, Revisiting the Role of Denial of Mental Illness in Capacity Determinations, supra 
note 14, at 168 (arguing that a patient’s lack of insight or denial of illness is insufficient to warrant 
incompetency, unless there is evidence the lack of insight stems from a “patently false belief,” such as 
believing the treating physician is a “malevolent devil”). 
 205 Compare People v. D.A., No. B278615, 2017 LEXIS 5786, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 
2017) (determining that an individual with anosognosia and schizophrenia lacked the competency to 
refuse treatment), with In re Virgil D., 524 N.W.2d 894, 895 (Wis. 1994) (holding that a patient with 
anosognosia and schizophrenia maintained the competency to refuse treatment). 
 206 See infra Part II. 
 207 See infra Part II.A. 
 208 See infra Part II.B. 
 209 See infra Part II.C. 
 210 524 N.W.2d at 895. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s 1994 decision In re Virgil D. does not 
specifically refer to the patient’s denial as anosognosia; it only stated that he “did not recognize that 
he was mentally ill.” See id. at 896. The court described the psychiatrist’s description of the patient, 
however, which suggests that the individual’s lack of insight was so pervasive as to equate to ano-
sognosia. See id. at 899 n.8 (recounting the testimony of the individual’s psychiatrist, which described 
the individual as “not hav[ing] an insight into the nature of his illness”). 
 211 Id. at 898; see also WIS. STAT. § 51.61(g)(4) (2020) (defining competency to refuse treatment 
in Wisconsin, the statute at issue in In re Virgil D.). 
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his illness warranted incompetency under this statute.212 Rejecting the reason-
ing of the Court of Appeals and reversing its decision, the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin found that the statute did not require individuals to understand that 
they were sick.213 Instead, the plain statutory language required patients to un-
derstand the effects, benefits, and risks of a particular treatment.214 Because the 
patient in In re Virgil D. was able to understand these elements, it did not mat-
ter that he could not understand his sickness, and the patient was thus compe-
tent to refuse treatment.215 
There are considerable benefits to finding a patient with anosognosia com-
petent.216 First, a diagnosis of a psychiatric condition may not be certain, and a 
finding of schizophrenia could potentially be disproven.217 A plethora of theories 
of mental illness exist, and two similarly educated psychiatrists may have differ-
ent opinions of a patient’s illness.218 Addington v. Texas, a 1979 Supreme Court 
decision where the Court determined that the burden of proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt could not be used in civil commitment hearings, reflects the challenge 
of diagnosing patients with mental illnesses.219 In its decision, the Court relied 
on the premise that psychiatry is imprecise, underscoring the fact that a psychiat-
ric condition is difficult to demonstrate to a certainty.220 Thus, hinging a compe-
                                                                                                                           
 212 See In re Virgil D., 524 N.W.2d at 895 (explaining the procedural history of the case); see also 
WIS. STAT. § 51.61(g)(4) (omitting any requirement that individuals understand that they are sick to 
be found competent). 
 213 In re Virgil D., 524 N.W.2d at 895. 
 214 See id. (stating the statutory requirements in Wisconsin for a finding of incompetency); see 
also WIS. STAT. § 51.61(g)(4) (defining competency under Wisconsin law). 
 215 See In re Virgil D., 524 N.W.2d. at 900 (concluding that the patient was competent to refuse 
treatment because he was able to comprehend the “advantages and disadvantages of, and the alterna-
tives to, accepting medication” even without understanding he had schizophrenia). The court empha-
sized the importance of patient autonomy in its decision. See id. Although the court may disagree with 
the decision a patient makes, the sole role of the court is to apply the prescribed statute. Id. The court 
emphasized that it is not its role to determine what is in the best interest of patients when they are 
determined to be competent to choose. See id. 
 216 See infra notes 217–228 and accompanying text. 
 217 Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, supra note 14, at 989. 
 218 Id. For example, some psychiatrists believe that the cause of mental illness is solely environ-
mental, although others believe that mental illness is caused by chemical imbalances in the brain. Id. 
Additionally, diagnosing mental illness largely relies on psychiatrists, not concrete tests. See Saks, 
Revisiting the Role of Denial of Mental Illness in Capacity Determinations, supra note 14, at 175. 
Unlike an x-ray, which would concretely show a broken bone, tests for mental illness rely on more 
subjective psychiatric evaluations. Id. It is easier for a patient to deny a finding of mental illness, on 
the basis of a doctor’s opinion, than a finding of a broken bone, on the basis of a visible x-ray. Id. 
 219 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979). 
 220 See id. (explaining that certainty is difficult to establish for psychiatric conditions because of 
the “subtleties and nuances” of these diseases). 
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tency determination upon a symptom of a psychiatric condition may not be cer-
tain enough for some to justify incompetency.221 
Second, the stigma of mental illness may lead patients to deny their con-
dition.222 The media still misunderstands mental illness, often portraying indi-
viduals with schizophrenia as violent.223 Patients that repeatedly deny their 
illness may not be suffering from anosognosia, but instead avoiding the stigma 
of being diagnosed with mental illness.224 
Third, finding patients incompetent any time they denied a supposed ill-
ness could have severe implications.225 For example, it could become possible 
for governments or other actors to hold those with radical political opinions 
incompetent when accused of being mentally ill and in denial.226 
Finally, patients’ lack of insight may not rise to the level of anosognosia or 
be sufficiently pervasive to warrant a finding of incompetency.227 Without a doc-
umented history of patients’ behavior, it may be difficult to determine whether 
they are in denial or living with anosognosia.228 Thus, finding patients with ano-
sognosia competent may have significant benefits, as it may account for poten-
tial inconsistencies in diagnosis and protect those who may be in denial.229 
B. A Patient Denying Obvious Symptoms or Holding Erroneous  
Beliefs Due to Anosognosia Is Incompetent 
When a patient’s anosognosia is coupled with absurd beliefs or leads to 
denial of verifiable symptoms of schizophrenia, one prominent theorist sug-
gests a finding of incompetency is warranted.230 For example, when an indi-
vidual denies an objectively apparent symptom such as insomnia, a finding of 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See id. (emphasizing that psychiatry is imprecise); see also Saks, Revisiting the Role of Denial 
of Mental Illness in Capacity Determinations, supra note 14, at 175 (suggesting that a finding of men-
tal illness is less concrete than determining whether an individual has a physical ailment). 
 222 See Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, supra note 14, at 990 (suggesting that some pa-
tients may deny their illness to avoid stigmatization by peers). One study suggests that a patient’s 
feelings of embarrassment are a barrier to seeking treatment. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PRE-
VENTION ET AL., ATTITUDES TOWARD MENTAL ILLNESS: RESULTS FROM THE BEHAVIORAL RISK 
FACTOR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM 1, 4 (2012), https://www.cdc.gov/hrqol/Mental_Health_Reports/
pdf/BRFSS_Full%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJL5-BLUA].  
 223 Owen, supra note 72, at 655. 
 224 Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, supra note 14, at 990. 
 225 Id. at 992. 
 226 See id. (describing the concern that allowing any denial of mental illness as a finding of in-
competency could lead to individuals being committed wrongfully for fringe ideas). 
 227 See AMADOR, supra note 1, at 49 (providing a framework for determining whether a patient is 
denying his or her illness or suffering from anosognosia). 
 228 See id. (describing the difference between denial and anosognosia). 
 229 See supra notes 216–228 and accompanying text. 
 230 See Saks, Revisiting the Role of Denial of Mental Illness in Capacity Determinations, supra 
note 14, at 181 (arguing that a court should only find individuals incompetent when they deny schizo-
phrenia and its obvious, verifiable symptoms). 
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incompetency would be justified.231 Denying a quantifiable symptom demon-
strates that the individual’s mental processing is so broken down that such in-
dividual is incompetent.232 Applying the same logic, patients that deny their 
illness because they believe the symptoms arise as a result of an infestation of 
evil spirits should be found incompetent.233 In these cases, a finding of incom-
petency is warranted because the patient’s lack of insight into the condition 
significantly warps reality.234 In both circumstances, there is clear evidence 
that the patient has delusions and symptoms of schizophrenia.235 Coupled with 
lack of insight, this is cause for a finding of incompetency.236 
When a patient’s denial of illness is caused by delusions or the patient de-
nies visible symptoms, there may be less cause for concern that a court is 
wrongfully taking away a patient’s right to refuse treatment.237 Requiring gross 
denial of symptoms or plainly false beliefs and denial of objectively apparent 
symptoms of the illness may help mitigate concerns that a patient is in denial 
or misdiagnosed with a psychiatric condition.238 The requirement of a clear 
denial of symptoms or completely absurd belief may lend more certainty to a 
psychiatric diagnosis of schizophrenia and anosognosia.239 For example, when 
a patient reports no difficulty sleeping but there is clear evidence of insomnia, 
                                                                                                                           
 231 Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, supra note 14, at 991. Elyn R. Saks, a prominent legal 
theorist who lives with schizophrenia, suggests that when a patient’s denial of an illness is based on 
“patently false beliefs,” a judge should find the patient incompetent. See Saks, Revisiting the Role of 
Denial of Mental Illness in Capacity Determinations, supra note 14, at 168 (describing the patently 
false belief theory). See generally SAKS, supra note 83 (describing Saks’s personal journey with 
schizophrenia). A “patently false belief,” difficult to define in the absolute, is a belief that significantly 
distorts reality. See Saks, Revisiting the Role of Denial of Mental Illness in Capacity Determinations, 
supra note 14, at 168 (explaining the definition of a patently false belief). Saks describes examples of 
what is not a “patently false belief” in her article: neither an individual’s belief that the individual’s 
doctor is not acting in the patient’s best interests nor that an antipsychotic is going to harm the indi-
vidual would be patently false beliefs. Id. These beliefs would not warrant incompetency. Id. In con-
trast, Saks suggests that a patient who believes the doctor is the devil or an evil being holds a patently 
false belief. Id. This belief distorts reality so significantly that it would warrant incompetency under 
Saks’ framework. Id. 
 232 See Saks, Revisiting the Role of Denial of Mental Illness in Capacity Determinations, supra 
note 14, at 181 (explaining that when patients deny observable symptoms they should be considered 
incompetent). 
 233 See id. at 168 (describing beliefs that are patently false and warrant a finding of incompeten-
cy). 
 234 See id. (explaining when beliefs are so false that they show an incompetency to make deci-
sions about treatment). 
 235 See id. at 182 (suggesting that incompetency must be demonstrated by concrete evidence). 
 236 See id. (arguing that findings of incompetency require clear evidence that patients are unable 
to understand their situation). 
 237 See id. (explaining the benefits of requiring that a patient have clear symptoms and denial for a 
finding of incompetency). 
 238 Id. 
 239 See id. 
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a doctor has direct evidence of a denial of a symptom.240 Similarly, when a pa-
tient reports a belief that the doctor is an evil demon, the doctor has clear evi-
dence that the patient is experiencing delusions.241 Denial of an apparent symp-
tom clearly demonstrates that a patient cannot understand a diagnosis or appre-
ciate its impact, which are requirements of many informed consent statutes.242 
Additionally, this view may encourage patients and doctors to thoroughly ex-
plore the individual’s reasoning.243 
C. A Patient with Anosognosia Is Incompetent 
When a patient has severe anosognosia, a court may find the individual is 
incapable of giving informed consent and therefore is incompetent.244 For ex-
ample, in 2017, in People v. D.A., a California appellate court held that an in-
dividual with schizophrenia and severe anosognosia was incompetent and 
could not give informed consent.245 As a result, the court upheld the involun-
tary administration of antipsychotic medication.246 The court emphasized the 
testimony of the patient’s doctor, who stated that the patient did not understand 
he had schizophrenia and thus refused to take his medication.247 The doctor 
testified that as a result of the lack of medication, the patient became paranoid, 
endured both visual and auditory hallucinations, had disordered thought-
processes, and felt persecuted by those trying to treat him.248 The court consid-
                                                                                                                           
 240 See Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, supra note 14, at 991 (explaining that when a 
patient’s beliefs “grossly distort reality,” an incompetency finding is warranted). 
 241 See id. (suggesting that absurd beliefs and denial of illness warrant incompetency). 
 242 See id. (arguing that a patient’s absurd beliefs, accompanied by denial of illness, can clearly 
demonstrate incompetency). 
 243 See Elyn R. Saks, Some Thoughts on Denial of Mental Illness, 166 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 972, 
973 (2009) (explaining that using this standard to determine a patient’s competency may encourage 
patients and doctors to explore the reasons a patient may deny illness).  
 244 See People v. D.A., No. B278615, 2017 LEXIS 5786, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2017) 
(finding a patient with schizophrenia, severe anosognosia, and some history of violence incompetent 
to make decisions regarding his treatment). 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. The appellant in the California Court of Appeal’s 2017 case People v. D.A. was a prisoner 
released on parole. Id. Under California law, when a prisoner meets certain statutory criteria, the pris-
oner can be required to attend involuntary treatment as a condition of parole. See CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 2962 (West 2020). To meet the requirements of this statute, the prisoner’s illness must be a cause or 
contributing factor for the crime the individual committed. Id. Regardless of the specific statute at 
issue, the court must still apply a competency test to determine whether a patient has a right to refuse 
the involuntary treatment. See D.A., 2017 LEXIS 5786, at *4 (applying a competency test to deter-
mine whether the individual is competent to refuse involuntary administration of antipsychotic medi-
cation). 
 247 See D.A., 2017 LEXIS 5786, at *2–3 (explaining the testimony of appellant’s doctor, who 
described anosognosia as analogous to “being color blind”). The appellant’s doctor explained that 
anosognosia was the root cause of the appellant’s refusal of medication. See id. 
 248 Id. The appellant believed his symptoms were a result of stress, rather than schizophrenia. Id. 
The patient testified that he did not “have a problem” with the medication itself. Id. at *3. Instead, he 
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ered the patient’s ignorance of his symptoms and diagnosis, and found that he 
was unable to weigh the pros and cons of medication.249 The patient could not 
rationally participate in his treatment decision because of his lack of insight.250 
Thus, the court determined he was incompetent and upheld the order allowing 
the doctor to administer antipsychotic medication involuntarily.251 
A finding of incompetency on the basis of anosognosia may be warranted 
because there is evidence that the symptom interferes with patients’ ability to 
make decisions about their treatment.252 The doctrine of informed consent aims 
to protect patient autonomy.253 Competency tests effectuate this goal by ensur-
ing patients who are able to make their own decisions are granted this right.254 
Psychiatric conditions directly affect parts of the brain that allow individuals to 
think and make decisions rationally and understand the likelihood of events 
happening in the future.255 Arguably, without proper insight into their condi-
tions, individuals cannot be making a free choice.256 Instead, the choice has 
been made by the disease because it has infiltrated their decision-making ca-
                                                                                                                           
disagreed with the underlying schizophrenia diagnosis that formed the basis of his prescription for 
antipsychotics. Id. 
 249 Id. at *4–6. 
 250 Id. California considers three factors when determining whether a person in this situation is 
competent to refuse treatment. Id. at *4. The Court must consider the following: 
(1) whether the patient is aware of his mental illness; (2) whether the patient under-
stands the benefits and risks of treatment as well as the alternatives to treatment; and (3) 
whether the patient is able to understand and evaluate the information regarding in-
formed consent and participate in the treatment decision by rational thought process. 
Id.  
 251 Id. at *6. 
 252 See Knepper, supra note 132, at 103 (suggesting that competency determinations should con-
sider whether a patient makes a decision due to a medical condition, rather than free, autonomous 
thought); see also SCHOPP, supra note 121, at 66 (explaining that some psychiatric disorders “under-
mine the autonomous capacities required to meet the threshold” for competency). These concerns are 
especially great for patients with schizophrenia because of the lack of insight that frequently accom-
panies the disease. Knepper, supra note 132, at 103. 
 253 WINICK, supra note 137, at 346. 
 254 See id. at 348 (explaining that even when patients make seemingly ridiculous decisions, if they 
are competent, the decisions must be respected). 
 255 See Epright, supra note 4, at 804 (describing the parts of the brain that psychiatric conditions 
implicate). Generally, scholars accept that psychotic diseases, like bipolar disorder and schizophrenia, 
affect the prefrontal cortex and dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex. Id. These two parts of the brain are 
responsible for an individual’s ability to make rational choices with autonomy. Id. Brain scans show 
that individuals with schizophrenia have defects in these parts of the brain. Id. at 804. Although treat-
ment outcomes may improve when patients choose their own treatments, it is unclear whether patients 
in the midst of psychosis can make the meaningful choice. WINICK, supra note 137, at 334–35. 
 256 See Epright, supra note 4, at 805 (explaining that when individuals lack insight into their con-
dition because a disease is blocking their ability to understand the situation, choices they make are not 
freely given). 
650 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:615 
pacity.257 Allowing patients with poor insight to decline medication is not nec-
essarily effectuating their free choice, which is the goal of informed consent, 
because the disease dictates the choice.258 Therefore, a finding of incompeten-
cy on the basis of anosognosia may help doctors best determine and effectuate 
a patient’s autonomous choice.259 
Not only could finding patients incompetent on the basis of anosognosia 
help to effectuate their autonomous choice in the present, it also may help retain 
patients’ ability to choose in the long-term.260 Over a long period, leaving schiz-
ophrenia and anosognosia untreated can cause patients to completely lose in-
sight.261 When patients with anosognosia refuse treatment in the present, they 
may be making a decision never to treat because their lack of insight will likely 
                                                                                                                           
 257 See id. (arguing that when patients have no insight into their condition because the disease is 
affecting their brain, the disease itself is choosing to deny treatment, not the patients). 
 258 See id. at 805 (suggesting that allowing a patient with anosognosia to deny treatment does not 
effectuate the patient’s autonomous choice). In 1986, in Colorado v. Connelly, the Supreme Court 
addressed whether a confession made by an individual with schizophrenia must be suppressed because 
the illness interfered with his ability to make a voluntary confession using his own “free will.” 479 
U.S. 157, 159 (1986). The Court determined that the individual’s illness did not render the confession 
inadmissible because it was still voluntary. See id. Justice William Brennan in dissent, however, cri-
tiqued the Court’s logic. Id. at 174 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan emphasized that the state 
trial court determined the individual had not given his voluntary confession because “he exercised a 
choice . . . mandated by auditory hallucination, [that] had no basis in reality, and . . . [was] the product 
of psychotic break with reality” and a testifying doctor stated he was “unable ‘to make free and ra-
tional choices’ due to auditory hallucinations.” Id. at 175. Because the confession came as a result of 
the individual’s mental illness, Justice Brennan found that it could not be considered the result of the 
patient’s free will or an autonomous decision-making process. See id. at 174–75 (explaining that the 
individual’s confession was inadmissible because it was not the product of the his free will). The logic 
Justice Brennan uses in his dissent is similar to that of experts who would find a patient incompetent 
on the basis of anosognosia. Compare id. (arguing that a patient with mental illness is not acting vol-
untarily when such patient confesses to a crime because the illness affects the decision-making pro-
cess), with Epright, supra note 4, at 805 (suggesting that a patient’s refusal to accept medication is not 
the individual’s volitional act but instead a manifestation of the patient’s illness). In both instances, 
the patient is not acting with free will but instead is influenced by illness. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 174–
75 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Epright, supra note 4, at 805. 
 259 See Epright, supra note 4, at 804–05 (explaining that schizophrenia has an impact on parts of 
the brain responsible for free-thinking and choice, and that imposing treatment that helps patients gain 
insight may help these individuals best exercise choice); see also Connelly, 479 U.S. at 175 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that a patient with schizophrenia had not given a voluntary confession because 
it was the result of his mental illness). 
 260 Epright, supra note 4, at 804–05. Arguably, informed consent is not meant to be forward-
looking. See id. A finding of incompetency on the basis that patients may in the future lose all ability 
to have insight into their condition is not effectuating the patients’ present desires, but instead consid-
ering their capacity in the future. See id. Thus, this broader approach to patient autonomy may not be 
persuasive to those that stringently apply informed consent laws or theories. See id. Some may be 
persuaded, however, by the possibility that patients’ anosognosia could eventually cause them to be-
come violent, which may place other people at risk. See id. 
 261 See id. (suggesting that when a patient with anosognosia decides to refuse treatment in the 
present, it “is tantamount to selling one’s self into slavery” because the decision will “likely result in 
an inability to make any and all future decisions”). 
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worsen without treatment over time.262 Some argue that if the goal of informed 
consent is to effectuate autonomy, ensuring patients’ long-term autonomy is best 
done by finding patients with anosognosia incompetent in the present.263 
Thus, there are three competing theories of competency as applied to pa-
tients with schizophrenia and anosognosia, leading to inconsistent outcomes 
for patients.264 Part III will explain why a patient with documented anosogno-
sia should be found incompetent, aligned with Section C of this Part, and pro-
pose a model statute that helps standardize the approach to competency for 
patients with this symptom.265 
III. A PATH FORWARD FOR COMPETENCY DETERMINATIONS: ENSURING 
DOCUMENTED ANOSOGNOSIA WARRANTS INCOMPETENCY 
As discussed in Parts I and II, informed consent laws across the United 
States vary on the basis of judicial interpretation and statutory construction.266 
Not all statutory schemes require patients to appreciate their illness to be com-
petent to refuse treatment, and even in those that do, the definition of “appreci-
ate” may vary.267 This Part argues that anosognosia should warrant a finding of 
incompetency, aligning with the theory described in Section C of Part II.268 
Additionally, this Part argues that specific statutory language, similar to that in 
Alaska’s competency statute, is necessary to ensure the statute is inclusive of 
individuals with anosognosia.269 Section A of this Part explains why statutory 
definitions of competency must include the element of “appreciation.”270 Final-
ly, Section B proposes a model statutory definition for competency that proper-
ly accounts for patients’ ability to appreciate their illness.271 
                                                                                                                           
 262 Id. 
 263 See id. at 805 (explaining that future autonomy is best protected by finding a patient with 
anosognosia incompetent in the present). 
 264 See supra Part II. 
 265 See infra Part III. 
 266 Berg et al., supra note 127, at 347. 
 267 Compare ALASKA STAT., § 47.30.837(d)(1) (2020) (requiring that patients appreciate that they 
have an impairment to be competent), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(1) (2020) (requiring that 
patients “appreciate the nature and consequences” of their treatment decisions to be competent). 
 268 See infra notes 272–307 and accompanying text (proposing a novel statutory definition of 
competency that ensures a patient with anosognosia is found incompetent); see supra Part II.C. (de-
scribing the theory of competency that would find a patient with anosognosia incompetent). 
 269 See infra notes 291–300 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of explicit statutory 
language). 
 270 See infra Part III.A. 
 271 See infra Part III.B. 
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A. Appreciation of Illness Is Fundamental to the Goals of Informed  
Consent and Necessary for a Finding of Competency 
Underlying informed consent doctrine is the goal of respecting a patient’s 
autonomous choice.272 Humans formulate choices in the brain.273 If an illness 
directly affects the part of the brain that contributes to a person’s ability to freely 
make choices, the illness or symptom must be considered in the competency 
determination.274 When an illness impacts the part of the brain that bears upon 
rational thinking, it cannot be said that the patient is actually acting with auton-
omy.275 The response is involuntary, the disease is thinking for the patient.276 
Evidence indicates that schizophrenia directly impacts parts of the brain 
responsible for an individual’s decision making.277 Anosognosia impacts an 
individual’s ability to think rationally, and directly affects the brain’s ability to 
accurately process information.278 Further, when a person with schizophrenia 
denies his or her illness and refuses treatment, it is likely that the patient’s con-
dition will deteriorate, rendering the individual even less likely to make auton-
omous choices in the future.279 When the brain continues to deteriorate, insight 
may worsen, creating potential long-term repercussions for the patient’s pre-
sent refusal of medication.280 Arguably, informed consent should focus solely 
on a patient’s current state of mind.281 But when a patient’s decision in the pre-
                                                                                                                           
 272 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (describing the goal of in-
formed consent as the patient making his or her own decision about treatment). 
 273 See Epright, supra note 4, at 804 (explaining the documented effect schizophrenia has on parts 
of the brain responsible for making choices). 
 274 See id. at 804–05 (suggesting that anosognosia and schizophrenia implicate areas of the brain 
that help individuals formulate thoughts and make choices about their treatment, and arguing that, as a 
result of the disease’s impact on these areas, patients may not be acting with autonomy); see also 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 174–75 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that an individ-
ual’s confession was involuntary and not the product of his free will because he confessed as a result 
of his schizophrenia symptoms). 
 275 See Epright, supra note 4, at 804 (explaining how an illness can implicate parts of the brain 
that affect a patient’s ability to make decisions). 
 276 See id. (describing how a disease can infiltrate a patient’s brain and affect the patient’s deci-
sion-making capacity); see also Connelly, 479 U.S. at 174–75 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting 
that a confession is involuntary when it is the result of an individual’s mental illness). 
 277 See Epright, supra note 4, at 804 (explaining the documented effect schizophrenia has on parts 
of the brain responsible for the patient’s decision-making process). 
 278 See POWERS, supra note 1, at 27 (describing the direct effect anosognosia has on the brain). 
 279 See Epright, supra note 4, at 804 (explaining that schizophrenia may be correlated with other 
psychiatric conditions, like dementia, that cause brain and insight impairment); see also Lehrer & 
Lorenz, supra note 99, at 15 (suggesting that medication that improves a patient’s insight “could have 
a tremendous” effect upon an individual’s success in treatment). 
 280 See Epright, supra note 4, at 804 (explaining that a patient’s refusal of treatment in the present 
may lead to disease progression and future increases in insight deficits). In fact, because the progres-
sive lack of insight may become extreme, a patient’s present refusal may actually act as a blanket 
refusal for the present and future. See id. 
 281 See infra notes 202–263 and accompanying text (describing the factors considered in varying 
theories of competency determinations, which focus on the patient’s present, not future, capabilities). 
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sent will effectively serve as the only meaningful opportunity to decide, con-
sidering future implications of the decision is warranted.282 
Thus, if the goal of informed consent is to effectuate a patient choice, in-
formed consent must determine whether a patient can appreciate the illness.283 
Illnesses of the brain have the potential to obfuscate a patient’s actual decision 
making.284 To fully determine whether a choice is autonomous, it is necessary 
to determine whether patients are able to appreciate that they have an illness.285 
Section B will offer model statutory language that ensures patients’ ability to 
understand their illness is encompassed in the definition of competency.286 
B. A Path Forward: Balancing Patient Autonomy and  
Modern Understandings of Mental Illness 
Currently, some jurisdictions already require patients to “appreciate” their 
illness to be competent to refuse treatment.287 Although the goal of including 
“appreciate” in a competency statute is to ensure the patient understands that 
the doctor’s treatment suggestions apply to the patient, exact statutory lan-
guage varies.288 For example, in Alaska, the statutory definition of competency 
explicitly requires patients to appreciate that they have an impairment, among 
                                                                                                                           
 282 See Epright, supra note 4, at 800. Considering a patient’s future capacity also reflects the fact 
that the harm schizophrenia causes to a patient may be categorized as “slow harm.” Kontos et al., 
supra note 100, at 1255. “Slow harms,” like becoming homeless, are not the focus of medical compe-
tency determinations. See id. Medical determinations of competency typically focus on the patient’s 
immediate capacities and the “fast harms,” like suicide, that the patient may currently present with. 
See id. 
 283 See Epright, supra note 4, at 804 (explaining that anosognosia, which causes patients to lack 
awareness of their illness, impacts parts of the brain that control decision-making abilities). Using 
only the “understanding” theory of competency is insufficient to ensure that patients are aware that 
they are sick. See supra notes 148–153 and accompanying text (explaining the application of the “un-
derstanding” theory of competency). 
 284 See TORREY, supra note 18, at 141 (suggesting that patients with anosognosia are not making 
decisions freely because positive symptoms, such as hallucinations or delusions, control their deci-
sion-making processes). 
 285 See Epright, supra note 4, at 804 (arguing that consent cannot be considered informed for 
patients with anosognosia if they are not receiving treatment because the disease has affected the abil-
ity of the patients to make decisions). 
 286 See infra Part III.B. 
 287 See Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1233 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (holding that a woman 
with gangrene was competent to refuse treatment because she appreciated the implications of her 
refusal); see also Berg et al., supra note 127, at 382 (explaining that many jurisdictions have adopted 
the appreciation standard). Adoption of the appreciation standard may ensure that those who lack the 
insight to understand that they are ill are considered incompetent. Berg et al., supra note 127, at 382. 
The “appreciation” standard requires that patients understand what the doctor is saying to them, and 
apply what the doctor is saying to themselves. See id. at 355 (explaining the appreciation standard of 
competency). 
 288 Compare ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(d)(1) (2020) (using specific language and requirements 
in the competency definition), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(1) (2020) (using less specific 
language in the definition of competency). 
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other requirements.289 Tennessee’s statute, however, is less specific and re-
quires that patients be able “to understand and appreciate the nature and con-
sequences” of their treatment decision. 290 
Alaska’s statutory language provides the clarity necessary to ensure that 
anosognosia is considered in a judge’s competency determination, and should 
act as a starting point for model statutory language.291 The statute explicitly 
states that patients who deny their condition in the face of significant evidence 
that the disease exists cannot be competent.292 Even Alaska’s statute, however, 
could be more clear.293 Additional clarity would serve two important purpos-
es.294 First, concrete statutory language would protect patients who have in-
sight into their condition but, for their own reasons, do not want to undergo 
treatment.295 Unlike vague “appreciate” standards, such as Tennessee’s statute 
that requires patients to “appreciate the nature and consequences” of their 
treatment decisions, specific language would ensure that only those who have 
medically documented anosognosia and not mere denial are found incompe-
tent.296 Protecting patient autonomy is essential to the doctrine of informed 
consent, and clear statutory language would help to serve this purpose.297 Sec-
                                                                                                                           
 289 ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(d)(1). 
 290 TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(1). Texas’s statute provides a definition for incapacity, which 
can be used to extrapolate a definition for competency, and includes language that is similar to the 
Tennessee statute. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 313.002(5) (West 2019) (finding indi-
viduals incapacitated when they are “lacking the ability . . . to understand and appreciate the nature 
and consequences of a treatment decision, including the significant benefits and harms of and reason-
able alternatives to any proposed treatment decisions”); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(1) 
(stating that a “competent person” is one “who is able to understand and appreciate the nature and 
consequences of a decision to accept or refuse treatment”). 
 291 See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(d)(1) (requiring that patients acknowledge their illness when 
there is “substantial evidence of its existence” to be competent). 
 292 Id. 
 293 See infra notes 303–307 (proposing additional language to ensure that the statute is specific 
enough to protect patient autonomy). 
 294 See infra notes 295–299 and accompanying text (explaining how the proposed statutory lan-
guage will improve the state of competency determinations in the United States). 
 295 See Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960) (explaining that even when a doctor 
may disagree with a competent patient’s choice about treatment, the doctor cannot “substitute his own 
judgement for that of the patient”). 
 296 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(1) (2020) (omitting any requirement that individuals be 
aware that they have an illness to be competent, and including statutory language that patients “appre-
ciate the nature and consequences” of their treatment decision-making); AMADOR, supra note 1, at 49 
(describing the elements of a test to determine whether a patient has anosognosia). 
 297 See supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text (describing the fundamental premise of in-
formed consent as patient autonomy). In addition, clear statutory language ensures that doctors and 
judges will not be able to revert competency decisions to the state of institutionalization. See supra 
notes 165–173 and accompanying text (describing the lenient standard for involuntary commitment 
from the 1940s to 1970s, which resulted in mass institutionalization of people with mental illness). At 
that time, patients were found to be per se incompetent if they had a mental illness. See supra notes 
165–173 and accompanying text (summarizing the standard for involuntary commitment during the 
1940s to 1970s). Statutory safeguards ensure that individuals will only be found incompetent if they 
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ond, explicit language ensures that judges cannot impose their own beliefs about 
denial into their statutory interpretation.298 Finally, specific language ensures that 
the statute reflects the best science available to test for anosognosia.299 
The proposed model statute would incorporate Alaska’s existing language 
and include additional requirements to safeguard individual’s rights to choose 
treatment.300 
“Competent” means that the patient: 
(A) Has the ability to assimilate relevant facts and to appreciate and 
understand the patient’s situation with regard to those facts, 
and;301 
(B) Appreciates that the patient has a mental illness or impairment, 
if the evidence so indicates;302 
 a. Patients’ denial of his or her mental illness is evidence that 
the patient lacks the capability to make treatment decisions 
when the patient’s denial constitutes anosognosia, a signifi-
cant deficit in insight.303 Denial is evidence of anosognosia 
when it has lasted over a period of at least six months, the 
denial does not change even if the individual is presented 
with evidence, and the individual offers other absurd expla-
nations to persuade others that he or she does not have an 
illness.304 
   i. The lack of insight must be documented during a pe-
riod of at least six months, and a doctor must be willing 
                                                                                                                           
meet specific criteria, and remain free to make their own decisions if they do not meet one of the 
statutory requirements, protecting the patient and the goals of the informed consent doctrine. See su-
pra notes 121–124 and accompanying text (explaining that the doctrine of informed consent aims to 
protect the personal beliefs and virtues of individuals and safeguard patients from rogue decisions of 
doctors). 
 298 See supra notes 131–136 and accompanying text (indicating that some informed consent stat-
utes may allow judges to impose their own beliefs upon patients). 
 299 See supra notes 131–136 and accompanying text (explaining that there are a variety of compe-
tency statutes and no clear consensus among approaches, suggesting a need for consistency among 
statutory approaches to reflect new scientific discoveries). 
 300 ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(d)(1) (2020); see AMADOR, supra note 1, at 49 (explaining that 
doctors should test whether a patient has anosognosia or denial as an assessment of the individual’s 
schizophrenia). 
 301 ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(d)(1). This language is taken directly from the Alaska statute. Id. 
 302 Id. This language is taken directly from the Alaska statute. Id. 
 303 AMADOR, supra note 1, at 49. Section B(a) begins the proposed addition to the statute. 
 304 See id. (explaining that doctors should test whether a patient has anosognosia or denial as an 
assessment of the individual’s schizophrenia). Xavier Amador, an expert on serious mental illness and 
the author of I Am Not Sick I Don’t Need Help! How to Help Someone with Mental Illness Accept 
Treatment, argues that anosognosia is present in the circumstances outlined in the proposed model 
statute. Id. 
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to testify to the patient’s lack of insight as a symptom 
of his or her disease, not mere denial.305 
 b. If a patient is found incompetent under Section B, he or she 
may be administered antipsychotic medication involuntari-
ly, if appropriate.306 When and if the patient obtains insight 
into his or her medical condition, the patient’s capacity 
must be reassessed by a medical professional and the pa-
tient’s competency must be reassessed by a judge.307 
Ultimately, a revised and specific competency statute would benefit pa-
tients.308 Specific statutory language ensures that only patients suffering from 
anosognosia, as opposed to denial, are captured by the statute, and also reflects 
the goals of informed consent.309 In addition, the proposed statute aims to pro-
tect the patient’s autonomous choice by requiring a reconsideration of the pa-
tient’s competency after a course of medication; this reflects the premise that 
antipsychotic medication can help patients gain insight into their condition.310 
Thus, the proposed statute would help to ensure the patient’s autonomous 
choice is honored at all stages of treatment.311 
CONCLUSION 
Getting treatment for schizophrenia or other serious mental illness is a 
difficult, multi-faceted process in the United States. Even after patients agree 
to treatment or is involuntary committed, they may maintain the right to refuse 
medication, arguably the most effective method of treating schizophrenia. Alt-
hough patients should have the right to refuse treatment when they are truly 
competent to decide, new science demonstrates that brain disorders directly 
                                                                                                                           
 305 See AMADOR, supra note 1, at 49. 
 306 See People v. D.A., No. B278615, 2017 LEXIS 5786, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2017) 
(finding that an individual with severe anosognosia was incompetent, and ordering the involuntary 
administration of antipsychotic medication). 
 307 See supra notes 126–136 and accompanying text (describing the relationship between a medi-
cal professional’s capacity determination and a judge’s legal competency determination). Requiring a 
reassessment of competency following the patient’s forced medication ensures that patient autonomy 
will be respected, which is the goal of informed consent. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (explaining that the doctrine of informed consent aims to ensure the patient’s deci-
sion-making is reflected in treatment). If a person gains insight into a condition and subsequently 
wishes to refuse further treatment, the doctor should respect the individual’s wishes, even if consid-
ered absurd or counter-intuitive to treating the patient. WINICK, supra note 137, at 348. 
 308 See supra notes 295–297 and accompanying text (describing the benefits of specific statutory 
language). 
 309 See supra notes 295–297 and accompanying text (suggesting that specific language protects 
patients from wrongfully being found incompetent). 
 310 See Epright, supra note 4, at 803 (stating that medication may help to improve a patient’s 
insight). 
 311 See supra notes 301–307 and accompanying text (explaining the proposed statute). 
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affect decision-making abilities. When a condition affects these parts of the 
brain or blocks patients’ awareness of their condition, there must be a better 
answer. 
Competency statutes must reflect modern science. Ensuring that judges 
consider documented anosognosia in the competency determination helps ef-
fectuate the best science available. Including statutory safeguards, such as 
documentation and doctor testimony, protects individuals who are in denial or 
have other reasons to refuse treatment. Adoption of this model competency 
statute would ensure patient autonomy is balanced against modern science, and 
help patients who lack insight into their condition get treatment. 
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